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CAPITALIZING ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
EISHA JAIN† 
ABSTRACT 
  The U.S. criminal justice system “piles on.” It punishes too many 
for too long. Much criminal law scholarship focuses on the problem of 
excessive punishment. Yet for the low-level offenses that dominate state 
court workloads, much of the harm caused by arrests and convictions 
arises outside the formal criminal sentence. It stems from spiraling 
hidden penalties and the impact of a criminal record. The key question 
is not just why the state over-punishes, but rather why so many different 
institutions—law enforcement institutions as well as civil regulatory 
agencies and private actors—find it valuable to do so. This Article 
argues that the reach of the criminal justice system is not just the 
product of overly punitive laws, but also the product of institutions 
capitalizing on criminal law decisions for their own ends. Criminal law 
is meant to serve a public purpose, but in practice, key institutions 
create, disseminate, and rely on low-level criminal records because they 
offer a source of revenue or provide a cost-effective way of achieving 
discrete administrative objectives. These incentives drive and expand 
the reach of the criminal justice system, even as they work in tension 
with the state’s sentencing goals. This dynamic creates obvious harm. 
But it also benefits key actors, such as municipalities, privatized 
probation companies, background check providers, employers, and 
others who have incentives to maintain the system as it is. This Article 
identifies how organizational incentives lead a host of institutions to 
capitalize on criminal law decisions, and it argues that reform efforts 
must, as a central goal, recognize and respond to these incentives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. criminal justice system “pil[es] on.”1 Police over-arrest, 
and the state over-imprisons. Commentators denounce “the challenge 
of over-criminalization; of over-incarceration; and over-sentencing.”2 
An ideologically diverse coalition views the criminal justice system as 
far too large.3 The Heritage Foundation, the Koch Foundation, and the 
 
 1. Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: Collateral Consequences and 
Community Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2015). 
 2. Marie Gottschalk, The Folly of Neoliberal Prison Reform, BOS. REV. (June 8, 2015), 
http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/marie-gottschalk-neoliberal-prison-reform-caught [https://
perma.cc/7JXH-MKZJ] (quoting Senator Mike Lee, “an influential Tea Party Republican”); 
Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join Forces on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2009) (“The 
problem of overcriminalization is truly one of those issues upon which a wide variety of 
constituencies can agree . . . . Witness the broad and strong support from such varied groups as 
the Heritage Foundation, the Washington Legal Foundation, the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, the A.B.A., the Cato Institute, the Federalist Society and the 
A.C.L.U.” (quoting Dick Thornburgh, attorney general under Presidents Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush)). 
 3. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. MUKASEY & PAUL J. LARKIN, JR., THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE 
PERILS OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION 1 (2015), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-perils-
overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/77P3-Y3AJ]; Charles G. Koch & Mark V. Holden, The 
Overcriminalization of America: How to Reduce Poverty and Improve Race Relations by 
Rethinking Our Justice System, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2015/01/overcriminalization-of-america-113991 [https://perma.cc/95RK-7SMY].  
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American Civil Liberties Union, among others, denounce the 
overcriminalization of America.4 Commentators agree that the harms 
of excessive punishment reach well beyond prison walls.5 Criminal 
penalties can trigger economic loss, break up families, damage 
communities, erode faith in the police, and lead to outcomes that 
appear arbitrary and procedurally unfair.6 Those released from prison 
can face collateral consequences long after the sentence has been 
served.7 
 
 4. Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541, 541 
(2005) (“The Heritage Foundation and the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (NACDL), two groups with very distinct missions, joined together . . . to examine the 
topic of overcriminalization.”). Others likewise warn that overbroad criminal laws make it 
possible for anyone to be treated “like a criminal.” See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, 
You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS 
REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE, “THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW” 43–56 (Timothy Lynch 
ed., 2009); Cara Sullivan, Criminalizing America: How Big Government Makes a Criminal out of 
Every American, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Nov. 12, 2013), https://www.alec.org/
article/criminalizing-america [https://perma.cc/Z3QW-5EGP]. For examples of other criticisms, 
see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 58 (2010) (arguing that the criminal justice system is designed to promote 
racial subordination); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT 1–2 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (arguing that collateral 
consequences function as an invisible form of punishment); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: 
Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012). 
 5. Though commentators on the right and left agree on the need for criminal justice reform, 
there are important differences between their approaches. For a discussion of these differences, 
see MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 2–3 (2015).  
 6. The literature is far too voluminous to catalogue here. For selected recent contributions, 
see Monica C. Bell, Police Reform & the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 
2068–73 (2017); Tracey L. Meares, Tom R. Tyler & Jacob Gardner, Lawful or Fair? How Cops 
& Laypeople Perceive Policing, 105 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 307–11 (2016).  
 7. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700 (2002) (arguing that collateral 
consequences can be far more meaningful than the formal criminal sentence); Eisha Jain, 
Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1208–09 (2016) (cataloguing different 
types of collateral consequences); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive 
State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 306–09 (2015); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 489–94 
(2010); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 
593–98 (2006); J.J. Prescott, Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release Regulations and Sex Offender 
Recidivism, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1038–41, 1055–58 (2016) (discussing sex offender registries); 
Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 
720–23 (2008) (arguing that the severity of a collateral consequence should be relevant in 
determining a defendant’s constitutional criminal procedure rights); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is 
Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an 
Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 479–80 (2005); see also MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, 
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In the past fifty years, overcriminalization has become the 
dominant conceptual framework for understanding the reach of the 
U.S. criminal justice system.8 Critics warn about the impact of 
overbroad criminal laws and their potential to suppress individual 
rights,9 and about the devastating toll of mass incarceration and its 
potential to operate as a new form of “civil death” or as the “new Jim 
Crow.”10 
The overcriminalization framework is powerful. It draws attention 
to the problem of excessive punishment, well beyond what can be 
justified by the state’s sentencing goals. Yet in focusing on excessive 
criminal penalties, this framework is also incomplete. It obscures how 
harm unfolds for the low-level offenses that consume the bulk of state 
criminal court caseloads.11 For these offenses, the criminal penalty 
itself may not appear disproportionate, at least as an initial matter. 
Rather, harm arises over time, including from spiraling criminal justice 
debt and ubiquitous reliance on criminal records by employers and 
others. The key question is not why the “state” imposes so much harm; 
it is why so many actors—police and prosecutors, as well as private 
actors and regulatory agencies—find it valuable to do so. 
This Article argues that the reach of the criminal justice system is 
not only the product of the state “piling on.” It is also the product of 
disaggregated institutions—both state and nonstate actors—making 
choices that they view as rational responses to discrete organizational 
incentives. That is not to say that these incentives themselves are 
 
JENNY M. ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013) (cataloguing collateral consequences). 
 8. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American 
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597, 597–98 (2011) 
(describing rhetoric relating to being “smart on crime” as a welcome change from rhetoric relating 
to being “tough” on crime); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and 
Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962) [hereinafter Kadish, Legal Norm]; 
Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17, 17 (1967); Erik Luna, 
Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 791 (2012). See generally 
Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); 
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2009) 
(arguing that American criminal punishment is increasingly unjust and excessive and is in need of 
limiting principles). 
 9. Kozinski & Tseytlin, supra note 4, at 43–56; Sullivan, supra note 4. 
 10. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 58; Chin, supra note 4, at 1790. 
 11. This Article uses the term “low-level” arrests to refer to arrests below the grade of felony. 
It encompasses both misdemeanors (typically punished by a maximum of a year in prison, and in 
practice, punished by little or no prison time) as well as infractions or violations (noncriminal 
offenses in penal law, typically punished by a fine).  
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desirable, nor that they create rational public policy outcomes. Rather, 
the organizational logic that motivates key institutions is distinct 
from—and often in tension with—the sentencing interests of the state. 
In theory, criminal justice decisions—arrests, convictions, and the 
use of criminal records—should reflect the state’s interest in 
punishment, such as in deterring crime. The institutions that generate 
and rely on criminal records are at times motivated by these concerns. 
But they also pursue other goals. They value arrests and their attendant 
criminal records as a source of revenue, as a way to demonstrate 
productivity, or because they offer a relatively low-cost way to monitor 
and manage populations over time. State actors, in effect, wear two 
hats; at times, they respond to public safety interests, but at other times, 
they respond to other incentives, particularly perceived financial 
incentives. Once criminal records are created, noncriminal legal 
institutions have incentives to appropriate them for a host of reasons. 
Criminal records fulfill a credentialing function. They offer a relatively 
cheap way to select job applicants, manage risk, insulate against 
liability for torts such as negligent hiring, and allocate scarce resources 
such as public benefits. The process of checking records can ease 
psychological anxiety about crime and, in some cases, it can deter 
crime. The financial benefits of this system are diffuse; they are 
experienced by employers, landlords, and regulatory agencies such as 
those tasked with providing professional licenses. The costs, 
meanwhile, are disproportionately experienced by the poor and people 
of color, who are the most likely both to be arrested and to experience 
disproportionate penalties as the result of a criminal record.12 
Because criminal law theory tends to conceptualize criminal 
punishment as driven by the state’s interest in the abstract, it has 
overlooked the importance of disaggregated interest group 
preferences in maintaining the current system. By contrast, in other 
areas of policy, scholars and courts recognize how rational interest 
group preferences lead to policies that deviate from the state’s interest. 
To offer an imperfect analogy, consider the funding structure for public 
schools. If public education seeks to provide each child with an equal 
 
 12. See Poverty and Opportunity Profile, Americans with Criminal Records, SENTENCING 
PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-
Criminal-Records-Poverty-and-Opportunity-Profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK6X-NZBJ] 
(reporting that “[b]lack men are six times more likely to be incarcerated than white men, and 
Hispanic men are 2.5 times more likely to be incarcerated than white men”). See generally Paul 
D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176 (2013) 
(arguing that poor African Americans are disproportionately the targets of mass incarceration). 
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opportunity,13 then a funding structure tied to local property taxes 
misses the mark. It permits significant funding disparities.14 Yet reform 
requires more than assessing how these disparities undercut society’s 
interest in education.15 It also requires identifying the interests of 
stakeholders, such as homeowners or local governments in well-funded 
districts.16 These stakeholders have interests in maintaining a system 
that promotes their own interests, even when they recognize that it is 
not an optimal system overall, one that accounts for the interests of 
society at large. 
This Article seeks to expand discussions of overcriminalization 
beyond the role of the state. It seeks to identify and account for the 
interests of stakeholders in maintaining the reach of the low-level 
criminal justice system. Stakeholders are not just interest groups like 
victims’ rights organizations that seek laws that are “tough on crime.” 
They also include those who value access to criminal records for a 
variety of reasons. 
The influence of key stakeholders has important implications for 
reform. For one, it calls into question the extent to which low-level 
arrests and convictions fulfill an appropriate public purpose. Key 
institutions such as police, prosecutors, privatized probation 
companies, background check providers, and others extract value from 
 
 13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (describing education as “perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments” and stating that, “it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.”).  
 14. Cory Turner et al., Why America’s Schools Have a Money Problem, NPR (Apr. 18, 2016, 
5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/18/474256366/why-americas-schools-have-a-money-
problem [https://perma.cc/KC4M-QXJF] (discussing how differences in local funding means that 
the state invests far more per student in wealthier districts, and offering an example of a district 
that invests $9794 per student, while a wealthier district an hour away invests $28,639 per student).  
 15. Funding disparities have been criticized for undercutting the state’s interest in promoting 
equality of opportunity. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) 
(Marshall, J. dissenting).  
Id. 
 16. For a discussion of the local politics of access to schools, see Nikole Hannah-Jones, 
Choosing a School for My Daughter in a Segregated City, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2016) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/magazine/choosing-a-school-for-my-daughter-in-a-
segregated-city.html [https://perma.cc/QQ4U-XKXL] (“In a city where white children are only 
15 percent of the more than one million public-school students, half of them are clustered in just 
11 percent of the schools, which not coincidentally include many of the city’s top performers.”). 
See also Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public 
Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1446 (2014) (discussing local governments in high property 
tax areas as stakeholders). 
JAIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2018  2:41 PM 
2018] CAPITALIZING ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1387 
the process of creating and using criminal records. This creates the risk 
that the criminal justice process is being imposed not for the benefit of 
the public, but for the benefit of particular institutions.17 This dynamic 
also affects the methods used by scholars to evaluate the need for 
reform. In particular, it calls into question the efficacy of cost-benefit 
analysis, which has in recent years spurred reform by showing how the 
costs of mass incarceration do not produce corresponding societal 
benefits. Yet this type of cost-benefit analysis may not work in the 
context of low-level arrests and collateral consequences. That is 
because disaggregated institutions stand to derive significant benefits 
from criminal justice decisions, regardless of their overarching costs. 
Responding to overcriminalization thus may require key institutions to 
change their practices, including by removing access to criminal record 
information that many find valuable. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I argues for a more 
expansive understanding of overcriminalization. In particular, it argues 
for focusing on low-level offenses, where the initial criminal 
punishment may not appear excessive, and for taking into account 
actors other than police, prosecutors, and judges. Part II identifies how 
key institutions use criminal justice decisions instrumentally. They use 
the criminal justice system to generate revenue, keep down costs, or 
achieve other organizational objectives. It argues that these decisions 
reflect a certain organizational logic, although the sum of these 
decisions does not make for rational policy overall. Part III examines 
the implications of these dynamics for misdemeanor reform. It argues 
for the importance of identifying stakeholders in the current system. 
Stakeholders include those with a vested financial interest in the 
criminal justice system, such as privatized probation companies and the 
background check industry, as well as others who gain significant value 
from widespread access to records. It also questions whether cost-
benefit analysis—which has been an important force in spurring reform 
targeted at mass incarceration—is of similar use in the context of low-
level offenses. Lastly, it preliminarily considers potential avenues for 
realigning the interests of stakeholders with those of the state. 
 
 17. By “institution,” this Article refers to formal organizations, whose purpose and structure 
are defined by an external set of rules. For a similar approach, see SHARON DOLOVICH & 
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 3–4 (2017) (arguing that the “full 
range of relevant law” governing criminal justice decisions includes not only the formal criminal 
punishment, but also “the laws establishing the terms of the penalties as actually served, along 
with the civil remedies, collateral consequences and disabilities, and all the laws of all the 
institutions—civil as well as criminal—that make up the socio-criminal complex”). 
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I.  THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
The dominant overcriminalization framework focuses on the 
state’s role in creating excessive criminal punishment. It has been 
enormously influential in illuminating the financial, psychological, and 
other burdens of mass incarceration, as well as its disparate impact on 
the poor and people of color. This Part briefly introduces the 
framework. It argues that while the overcriminalization account has a 
great deal of explanatory power, it is also incomplete. The 
overcriminalization account is state focused, particularly felony 
focused. This focus risks obscuring how harm unfolds from low-level 
arrests, where the initial formal penalty is typically minimal. Harm 
arises over time, including through the use of criminal records. In 
addition, the overcriminalization framework tends to take a bird’s eye 
view of the criminal justice system; it focuses on the aggregate costs 
and benefits of the system as a whole. This approach is effective in 
demonstrating how the costs of the system outweigh its benefits. 
However, it risks obscuring the powerful incentives that lead discrete 
actors to create, disseminate, and rely on criminal records. As Part II 
discusses, these incentives are key to understanding why the system 
remains in place. 
A. The Overcriminalization Framework 
It’s a familiar story by now. The U.S. criminal justice system is a 
colossus, its reach unprecedented by both global and historical 
measures.18 The United States houses approximately one-fifth of the 
world’s prisoners.19 Yet incarceration represents just a fraction of the 
criminal justice system. About 1 percent of the U.S. adult population—
2.3 million Americans—lives in prisons or jails. Almost twice as 
many—four million people—are on probation.20 Approximately one 
 
 18. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf [https://perma.cc/THA8-HAKJ] (reporting that 
approximately one out of every thirty-five adults in the United States, or approximately 3 percent 
of the adult population, is under some form of correctional supervision—probation, parole, or 
incarceration); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html [https://perma.cc/DY8Q-VUN4]. 
 19. ROY WALMSELY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION 
LIST 5 (11th ed., 2016), http://prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_
prison_population_list_11th_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4WN-UCZ7]. See generally Sharon 
Dolovich, Foreward: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 254 & n. 114 
(2009) (discussing American prison conditions).  
 20. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T 
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out of every thirty-five adults live under some form of corrective 
supervision—incarceration, probation, or parole.21 An estimated one 
out of every three people will be arrested by the time they reach the 
age of twenty-three.22 For African Americans, the number is closer to 
one in two.23 
In the past fifty years, overcriminalization has become the 
dominant conceptual framework for understanding this dynamic. First 
coined by Professor Sanford Kadish in 1962, the concept of 
overcriminalization focuses on using criminal sanctions—the “heavy 
artillery of society”—to reach conduct that could be better regulated 
by other means.24 While there is no single definition of 
overcriminalization, common hallmarks include overbroad criminal 
laws, grossly disproportionate punishment, and excessive delegation of 
discretion to law enforcement officers.25 This, in turn, leads to arbitrary 
 
OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 2 (2014), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KUW-N3F9]. 
 21. See GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 18, at 1. 
 22. Robert Brame, Michael G. Turner, Raymond Paternoster & Shawn D. Bushway, 
Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 
(2012). 
 23. Robert Brame, Michael G. Turner, Raymond Paternoster & Shawn D. 
Bushway, Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).  
 24. Kadish, Legal Norm, supra note 8, at 909; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and 
Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 721 (2013); Luna, supra note 8, at 785 (“As 
far as I can tell, Sanford Kadish coined the term ‘overcriminalization’ in a 1962 article in the 
Harvard Law Review, where he noted the phenomenon of ‘criminal statutes which seem 
deliberately to overcriminalize, in the sense of encompassing conduct not the target of legislative 
concern.’”); see also Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal 
Sanctions, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 737, 738 (1981) (describing criminal law as the “heavy artillery of 
society”); Fernando Molina, A Comparison Between Continental European and Anglo-American 
Approaches to Overcriminalization and Some Remarks on How to Deal with It, 14 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 123, 125 (2011) (defining overcriminalization as “too much criminal law”); Josh Shepherd, 
The Government vs. YOU, DAILY SIGNAL (June 14, 2013), http://dailysignal.com//2013/06/14/
morning-bell-the-government-vs-you/?_ga=1.173785766.444958766.1482949459 [https://perma.cc
/DC2H-WBS8] (describing overcriminalization and activism to counteract it).  
 25. Professor Sara Sun Beale defines overcriminalization as characterized by: “(1) excessive 
unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) inevitable disparity among similarly situated 
persons, (3) potential for abuse by enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other 
significant values and evade significant procedural protections, and (5) misdirection of scarce 
resources (opportunity costs).” Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From 
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005). Similarly, 
Erik Luna defines overcriminalization as characterized by the following characteristics: “(1) 
untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that overextend culpability; (4) crimes 
without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or 
pre-textual enforcement of petty violations.” Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 
54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005). 
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outcomes, such as arrest decisions that reflect variation in officer 
discretion rather than variation in the underlying conduct.26 This 
dynamic also undermines the moral force of the criminal justice system 
and its deterrent effect.27 
Overcriminalization also creates other harm. Mass incarceration 
causes employers to lose out on potential workers. Families break up. 
It exposes prisoners to the threat of sexual and physical abuse.28 And 
the cycle perpetuates itself. Prisoners are unlikely to gain valuable 
skills while in prison, and employers are unlikely to hire those with 
criminal records or with employment gaps.29 This, in turn, can lead to 
recidivism.30 
Critics warn that the financial outlay necessary to support mass 
incarceration is enormous. As President Barack Obama recently put it: 
“If one includes the cost of jail and prison at the state and local level, 
the total U.S. budget for incarceration rises to a staggering $81 billion, 
enough to fund transformative initiatives like universal preschool for 
every three- and four-year old in America . . . .”31 
 
 26. Luna, supra note 25, at 723–24. 
 27. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (empirical study 
demonstrating that the public obeys the law largely because of its perceived moral legitimacy, not 
due to a fear of getting caught and punished); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring 
of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 
1877 (1992) (arguing that “the criminal law should not be overused” for fairness considerations 
because “overuse will impair the criminal law’s nondeterrent functions”); Kenneth Mann, 
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 
1802 (1992) (advocating for limiting criminal law to clearly egregious cases where civil damages 
would be ineffective).  
 28. ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 
REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008, at 8 (2012), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/
i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/Huus/svrfsp08%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MS7-
X85U] (finding that 10 percent of inmates experienced sexual abuse in prison); Jennifer M. 
Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. L. REV. 709, 745–46 (2015) (discussing the 
potential for physical, emotional, and sexual abuse in prison).  
 29. LAW ENF’T LEADERS TO REDUCE CRIME & INCARCERATION, FIGHTING CRIME & 
STRENGTHENING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AGENDA FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 11 (2017). 
 30. Id. at 5 (“Bloated prison populations harm more than they protect. . . . The country 
spends $274 billion per year on its criminal justice systems, without ensuring the required public 
safety gains.”). See generally Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Att’y Gen., Addressing National Reentry 
Week Event in Philadelphia (Apr. 25, 2016) (discussing how collateral consequences for former 
prisoners, such as the inability to work or obtain housing, can promote recidivism).  
 31. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 811, 818 (2017) (citations omitted); see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic 
Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1837, 1843 (2015) (“State and federal correctional costs 
now exceed $80 billion per year. After adding judicial, legal, and police costs, this amount climbs 
to $260 billion annually.” (footnotes omitted)); Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following 
the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), 
JAIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2018  2:41 PM 
2018] CAPITALIZING ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1391 
Despite these costs, the barriers to reform are daunting. There are 
many reasons why overbroad criminal laws proliferate. Politics 
provides one common explanation. Lawmakers face pressure to 
demonstrate that they are “tough on crime.” Another explanation 
focuses on lawmakers’ incentives to use the rhetoric of crime control 
to generate support for public policy choices that are actually 
motivated by the desire to manage the poor and people of color.32 
Lawmakers and prosecutors have reason to prefer broad criminal laws 
because they allow prosecutors and police to exercise significant 
discretion over their caseloads.33 Another explanation is dysfunction in 
the lawmaking process. Lawmakers tend to write overinclusive laws 
without sufficient regard to the laws already in place. A criminal law 
may appear reasonable when viewed in isolation, but “may turn out to 
be utterly unreasonable when it is considered against the background 
of laws already on the books.”34 
B. The Missing Picture 
The overcriminalization critique has a great deal of power. It 
highlights the gap between the state’s rationales for punishment and its 
actual use of criminal sanctions. Yet in today’s world—where criminal 
records are seamlessly transmitted and the impact of a criminal record 
can last for decades—it is also incomplete. The overcriminalization 
account tends to focus on the state’s role in imposing too much 
punishment, specifically its role in imposing lengthy felony sentences. 
This risks obscuring the impact of low-level arrests and of collateral 
consequences triggered by those arrests. 
Low-level offenses matter because of their volume, and because 
they tend to trigger harm in a different manner than felonies. In terms 
 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html [https://perma.cc/9LTN-MDF6] (breaking 
down the cost of various portions of the criminal justice system). 
 32. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 58 (arguing that the government’s 
preoccupation with crime and drug offenses created a pathway for governance through penal 
sanctions against minority communities); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: 
HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A 
CULTURE OF FEAR (2007) (arguing that crime control has become a “strategic” issue, with the 
rhetoric of crime control used to justify policies that are in fact motivated by reasons unrelated to 
crime control). 
 33. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 
(2001) (describing “the story of American criminal law” as “a story of tacit cooperation between 
prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes”). 
 34. Larkin, supra note 24, at 722. 
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of volume, minor offenses dominate the practices of state courts.35 As 
Professor Alexandra Natapoff discusses, misdemeanors outnumber 
felonies by a ratio of about five to one.36 Approximately 80 percent of 
state caseloads consist of minor offenses.37 Offenses like suspended 
license cases, disorderly conduct, minor drug possession, and minor 
assault commonly trigger jail time, but they do not typically trigger a 
hefty formal sanction.38 Instead, the top concern for many defendants 
is whether a conviction will trigger deportation or pose a barrier to 
obtaining work, renting a home in public housing, or seeking a student 
loan.39 
 
 35. Professor William Stuntz described criminal law as “not one field but two. The first 
consists of a few core crimes . . . murder, manslaughter, rape, [etc.] . . . . The second consists of 
everything else. Criminal law courses, criminal law literature, and popular conversation about 
crime focus heavily on the first. The second dominates criminal codes.” Stuntz, supra note 33, at 
514. 
 36. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1063 
(2015) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization]; Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320–22 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors] 
(summarizing research indicating that “the world of misdemeanors looks to be about four or five 
times the size of the world of felonies.”). 
 37. R. LAFOUNTAIN, R. SCHAUFFLER, S. STRICKLAND & K. HOLT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT 
CASELOADS 24 (2012), http://www.courtstatistics.org//media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA
%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx [http://perma.cc/HQ5P-XLCX] (showing that misdemeanors 
significantly outnumber felonies in the criminal caseloads of seventeen selected states); R. 
LAFOUNTAIN, R. SCHAUFFLER, S. STRICKLAND, C. BROMAGE, S. GIBSON & A. MASON, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 
STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages//media/
Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx [http://perma.cc/4PWV-5BNS] (showing that 
misdemeanor cases constitute an “overwhelming majority of criminal caseloads”); Victor Eugene 
Flango, Trends in State Courts: Judicial Roles for Modern Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., 
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2013/home/Monthly-Trends-
Articles/Judicial-Roles-for-Modern-Courts.aspx [http://perma.cc/4ZQN-SU4S] (“Approximately 
[80] percent of criminal cases are misdemeanors.”). 
 38. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 36, at 1321 (describing jail as a “crucial feature of 
the misdemeanor landscape”). 
 39. See, e.g., JAMES JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 3 (2015) (“For many, 
perhaps the majority of, defendants the most serious consequence of an arrest is the resulting 
criminal record.”); Eisha Jain, Arrests As Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 815 (2015); Gabriel 
J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST., Fall 2002, at 253, 253–54 (explaining why collateral consequences may 
matter more for a low-level drug arrest than the formal sentence); Robert M.A. Johnson, A 
Prosecutor’s Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 132 
(2011) (offering examples of the inability to find employment, housing, deportation, and 
revocation of a driver’s license as civil consequences that “are often far greater than any 
consequence imposed by a judge at sentencing.”); Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 
supra note 36, at 1089 (discussing how contact with the criminal justice system can be “devastating 
to an offender’s employment and financial future”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: 
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These penalties are relatively new. They are distinct from the 
inevitable harms that have always accompanied the process of arrest. 
Any contact with the criminal justice system can trigger 
embarrassment, stress, anxiety, or damage to reputation.40 As former 
Labor Secretary Ray Donovan famously asked after his high-publicity 
trial and acquittal, “Which office do I go to get my reputation back?”41 
To some extent, this type of intangible harm will inevitably arise from 
even the most justified prosecutions. 
Today, however, contact with the criminal justice system triggers 
systemic, formalized, and enduring harm in a way that was not possible 
prior to the “big data” revolution.42 Criminal records create harm 
starting from the moment of arrest.43 Arrest data are widely 
transmitted, and arrests alone can trigger stiff penalties regardless of 
whether charges are ultimately dismissed.44 
Traditional criminal law theory is poorly situated to understand 
how criminal records and collateral consequences affect the experience 
of punishment. Criminal law theory focuses on a limited set of state 
actors: lawmakers who write criminal laws, police who make arrests, 
 
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297–300 
(2011) (describing how minor misdemeanors can lead to “major consequences” including 
deportation, the ability to “find and keep” work, and to access or remain in public housing).  
 40. For a discussion of dignitary harm, see Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. 307, 326–27 (2016) (Police are permitted to require “every arrestee entering a jail to be 
required to strip, open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his 
genitals to enable officers to search for scars, tattoos, and contraband, regardless of the risk he 
may pose.”) (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 316, 333–38 (2012)). 
 41. Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges by Jury in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (May 
26, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/26/nyregion/donovan-cleared-of-fraud-charges-by-
jury-in-bronx.html [https://perma.cc/7DHR-JQVH]. Further, psychological harm is not limited to 
the accused. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 
1383 (2002) (noting “[t]raditional criminal law theories . . . make [no] place for the collateral 
consequences visited upon others when an offender is punished,” and arguing that they should).  
 42. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 327, 354 (2015) (discussing how electronic data “reveals information about individuals 
that simply was not knowable in previous generations”); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and 
the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2002) (discussing 
law enforcement’s ability to obtain sensitive data from third parties). 
 43. Criminal history records are defined as “identifiable descriptions and notations of 
arrests, detentions, indictments, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising 
therefrom, including acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervision, or release.” 42 U.S.C. 
§  14616(I)(4)(A) (2012). 
 44. Jain, supra note 39, at 826–44 (discussing civil penalties triggered by arrest alone); see 
also CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, MOVING BEYOND 
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-
on-Bail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJE8-48TV] (discussing the impact of bail on arrestees). 
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prosecutors who bring charges and plea bargain, and judges and 
juries.45 That is because no one lands in prison without first being 
prosecuted and sentenced. By contrast, harm from low-level offenses 
arises at many different points in time and from an array of different 
actors. 
The state plays an important role in triggering formal punishment, 
as well as in triggering nonpenal harm that is deeply enmeshed with 
criminal punishment.46 In some cases, the state mandates that 
convictions trigger certain noncriminal penalties. This occurs, for 
instance, when a legal rule mandates deportation or removal from 
public housing following a conviction.47 In other cases, legal rules 
incentivize private actors or civil regulatory bodies to take enforcement 
action, such as through mandatory background checks for certain 
occupations or licenses.48 And in other cases, private actors choose to 
impose civil penalties absent any overt state regulation, though their 
reliance on criminal records is made possible because of access to state 
databases.49 The formal criminal penalty is just one aspect of how the 
criminal justice system regulates arrested individuals. 
For defendants, the consequences of a criminal record can last 
long after any criminal sentence is complete.50 Consider the following 
examples, collected primarily from a 2014 report that examined the 
impact of collateral consequences on a number of different 
communities: A twenty-five-year-old conviction for possessing twenty-
five dollars of cocaine cost Chicago resident Darrell Langdon a job as 
 
 45. Cf. DOLOVICH & NATAPOFF, supra note 17, at 3 (arguing for expanding the focus of 
criminal law scholarship to include “civil remedies, collateral consequences and disabilities,” 
rather than focusing solely on the formal criminal justice process). 
 46. The Supreme Court has recognized this dynamic in the context of deportation. In Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the Court ruled that deportation is so “enmeshed” with the 
criminal justice system that defense attorneys have a Sixth Amendment obligation to warn 
defendants if a plea agreement may trigger mandatory deportation. Id. at 365. 
 47. The criminal conviction at issue in Padilla mandated deportation. Id. at 366. 
 48. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i)(B) (2017) (requiring public housing leases to contain 
language that prohibits drug-related activity on or off the premises); James Jacobs & Tamara 
Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 177, 209 (2008) (offering examples of the Patriot Act and other federal laws that 
require background checks).  
 49. Wayne Logan describes this type of discretionary penalty—one that is not formally 
imposed by the state but that falls within “the gamut of negative social, economic, medical, and 
psychological consequences of conviction”—as an informal “collateral consequence.” Wayne 
Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2013). 
 50. See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 195–207 (2015) (discussing injuries resulting from public 
access to arrest information, even absent convictions). 
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a school boiler-room engineer.51 A fifteen-year-old nonviolent drug 
conviction barred Florida mother Jessica Chappione from 
volunteering at her children’s school.52 Low-level arrests can also 
trigger steep penalties even without conviction. Bronx resident 
Michailon Rue, for instance, was never convicted of a crime, but he lost 
his $17-an-hour job as a maintenance worker because of the repeated 
court dates for his criminal case.53 
These cases illustrate how the creation of a criminal record—both 
through the process of arrest and conviction—can hold a significance 
that is distinct from the act of punishment. The complaint is not that 
the state made an incorrect decision to punish, nor that the formal 
punishment itself was excessive or inappropriate. Rather, contact with 
the criminal justice system triggered penalties that the defendant 
experienced as a grossly disproportionate and unjustified form of 
punishment. 
In sum, the overcriminalization framework, with its focus on 
overbroad laws and excessive criminal penalties, risks obscuring 
important aspects of low-level criminal cases. It also takes a narrow 
view of the relevant players—police, prosecutors, and others who 
administer punishment. This approach overlooks the many different 
institutions that impose harm through low-level offenses and their 
collateral consequences. As the next Part discusses, the incentives of 
these institutions are key to understanding why the system remains in 
place.  
II.  INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES AND THE MARK OF A CRIMINAL 
RECORD 
In the context of misdemeanors, overcriminalization is not just the 
product of overbroad laws or excessive penalties. It is also the product 
of discrete choices to treat criminal records as valuable commodities. 
This Part identifies the incentives and institutional design features that 
 
 51. NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA’S 
FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 19 (2014), http://www.nacdl.org/
restoration/roadmapreport [https://perma.cc/4AGW-PZEJ] (collecting testimony from over 150 
witnesses in six cities regarding the impact of collateral consequences). Langdon was eventually 
able to get his job back, with the assistance of “a dedicated attorney, a sympathetic judge, and 
media attention.” Id. at 22. 
 52. Id. 
 53. William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for-
misdemeanor-cases-trials-are-elusive.html [https://perma.cc/668Q-Z6FZ].  
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facilitate overcriminalization in this context. First, the criminal justice 
bureaucracy is just one of many that process criminal records. Thus, 
even when the key players within any given criminal justice system—
police, prosecutors, and judges—reach dispositions that reflect 
appropriate penal aims, other legal institutions have the ability to 
magnify the impact of a criminal record. Criminal justice actors have 
little ability to control the full impact of a record, including when it cuts 
against their sentencing objectives. 
Second, both criminal law enforcement institutions and others 
have incentives to use criminal records for reasons that are distinct 
from the state’s interest in punishment. Criminal records are at times 
created and used to promote public safety or to serve retributive ends. 
But other considerations, particularly financial incentives, skew 
decisions at every stage of the process. Money can skew decisions to 
make arrests, affect who ends up with an arrest record, and play a 
critical role in decisions relating to bail and the imposition of 
probation. Once criminal records are created, financial incentives drive 
how those records are used. The process is furthered by the 
privatization of key aspects of criminal justice industry, as well as by 
the privatized background check industry. It is also driven by 
institutions that rely on records to lower costs, generate revenue, and 
monitor risk. This dynamic undermines the public purposes of 
punishment. It creates the risk of harm being imposed not for the 
benefit of the community at large, but rather for the benefit of 
particular institutions—law enforcement agencies, private actors, 
privatized commercial background check providers, and others who 
extract value from the use of criminal records. 
This Part first explains how interactions between criminal and 
noncriminal legal institutions prevent prosecutors and judges from 
controlling the full impact of a criminal record. The bulk of this Part 
then discusses the organizational incentives, with a focus on financial 
incentives, that magnify the impact of low-level arrests and convictions. 
Lastly, it explains how these at times conflicting uses of the criminal 
justice system are not subject to meaningful regulatory oversight. 
A. Institutional Structure 
Discussions of the institutional structure of criminal law 
commonly focus on the division of power between various actors 
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tasked with formal law enforcement power.54 Within any given law 
enforcement bureaucracy, actors work together to achieve their 
agency’s goals: police, prosecutors, judges, and others work together to 
create dispositions that reflect the agency’s priorities. The process is 
flawed, by many measures, but there is a process.55 
By contrast, there is no single process that governs the use and 
impact of criminal records. The relevant institutions include criminal 
justice agencies as well as those with no formal law enforcement power 
at all. Decisions made by actors outside the formal criminal justice 
process thus have the potential to undercut the sentencing goals of 
judges and prosecutors. 
Easy access to criminal records allows institutions outside the 
formal criminal justice system to have a profound impact on criminal 
record-holders. The United States is a global outlier in making criminal 
record history widely available.56 In the relatively recent past, a person 
who wanted to check a criminal record needed to seek out a paper file 
from the courthouse. But today, criminal records are easily and cheaply 
transmitted electronically, allowing widespread access.57 Virtually all 
employers conduct background checks on some or all employees,58 
including in ways that are overbroad.59 Immigration enforcement 
 
 54. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 
MICH. L. REV. 187, 195–202 (2017) (describing fragmentation of decisionmaking authority 
between federal and state law enforcement officials, as well as between enforcement officials 
within any given agency). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What 
the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519 (2011) (discussing the allocation of 
power between local, state, and federal prosecutors).  
 55. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 154–66 (1992) (describing the process that goes into evaluating 
the “worth” of a misdemeanor in the observed New Haven court).  
 56. See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 159 (comparing U.S. and European practice regarding 
criminal records); Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to 
Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 34 (2016) (discussing post-1970s trends that made 
criminal histories “a distinctive facet of American penal policy”). 
 57. This dynamic applies to the “Big Data” phenomenon generally; it is not unique to 
criminal records. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002) (discussing how the Internet revolution made 
public records much more accessible).  
 58. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON 
THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS 
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 6 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance] (noting that over 90 percent of employers conduct background checks 
on at least some employees). 
 59. In 2010, for instance, a class action alleged that the U.S. Census Bureau disqualified all 
applicants with any previous arrest history—regardless of the offense or when it occurred—unless 
the applicant could provide “official” records of the disposition within thirty days. Second 
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officials check the immigration status of every person arrested for any 
crime in order to select some noncitizens for removal.60 Landlords and 
public housing authorities also restrict eligibility based on criminal 
records.61 The criminal justice bureaucracy is just one of many distinct 
bureaucratic processes that determine the impact of a criminal record. 
This dynamic has feedback effects on the criminal justice process. 
First, it means that prosecutors, defendants, judges, and defense 
attorneys have incomplete information about the full impact of a 
particular sentence. Some defendants find out about serious 
noncriminal penalties only after accepting a plea. Joseph Abraham, for 
instance, a sixty-seven-year-old schoolteacher, pled to misdemeanor 
charges that imposed probation, but he learned only after the fact that 
the plea also triggered mandatory pension loss—an additional penalty 
of $1500 a month for the rest of his life.62 Abraham’s situation is not 
unique. Minor misdemeanor pleas can also trigger serious 
consequences such as sex offender registration or occupational license 
restrictions.63 With the important exception of mandatory deportation, 
 
Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Houser v. Blank, No. 1:10–cv–3105 (FM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
21, 2012). This practice barred 700,000 applicants from work and had a predictable disparate 
impact on African American and Latino applicants. Id. at 2; see also Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, 
Houser v. Blank, No. 1:10–cv–03105 (FM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012) (discussing factual 
background and the terms of the settlement). In 2008, BMW adopted a policy that required 
existing workers at a South Carolina plant to undergo background checks, and it automatically 
eliminated those with a range of criminal records, regardless of the date of the offense or the 
strength of the applicant’s subsequent work history at BMW. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, BMW to Pay $1.6 Million & Offer Jobs to Settle Fed. Race Discrimination 
Lawsuit (Sept. 8, 2015) [hereinafter EEOC Press Release], https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/9-8-15.cfm [https://perma.cc/NA8S-ZYZU]. Approximately 80 percent of the workers 
eliminated by this policy were black. Id. 
 60. Christopher Lasch et al., Understanding Sanctuary Cities, 58 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 23–26), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3045527 
[https://perma.cc/LL8R-EGGP] (discussing Secure Communities); see Secure Communities, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities [https://perma.cc/
KES4-JB5Y] (explaining that the Secure Communities program checks the fingerprints of 
arrested individuals against the fingerprints in the Department of Homeland Security database).  
 61. Complaint at 2, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle Towers Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. 1:14–
cv–6410 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2014) (challenging under the Fair Housing Act policy barring tenants 
with criminal records); see also United States of America’s Statement of Interest, Fortune Soc’y 
v. Sandcastle Towers Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. 1:14–cv–6410 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2016). 
 62. Pennsylvania v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 344 (Pa. 2012); Brief of Appellant, Abraham, 62 
A.3d 343; see also Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: 
From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 92–96 (2011) (discussing the 
lower court decisions in the Abraham case). 
 63. Roberts, supra note 7, at 683 (discussing how certain misdemeanor charges can trigger 
sex offender registration); see also MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, 
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defense attorneys are not required to warn defendants about 
noncriminal penalties triggered by guilty pleas.64 This creates the 
possibility that defendants will be in the dark about important 
collateral consequences when making the decision to plead guilty. 
Second, even when fully informed, judges, prosecutors, and others 
have limited control over how criminal records are used. They lack the 
ability to regulate effectively the impact of a criminal record. A 2016 
decision by Judge John Gleeson is illustrative.65 Fifty-seven-year-old 
“Jane Doe” was convicted in October 2002 of a one-time act of 
insurance fraud.66 Doe participated in a staged car accident and falsely 
claimed to be injured.67 She served a fifteen-month sentence and paid 
restitution.68 But thirteen years after she completed her sentence, she 
found that her criminal record prevented her from working as a nurse.69 
Over twelve different employers or agencies rejected her application 
because of her record.70 
In Doe’s case, the formal criminal punishment was of a fixed 
length, but the employment penalty was not. When reviewing her 
sentence, Judge Gleeson commented that he had “no intention to 
sentence her to the unending hardship she has endured in the job 
market.”71 He attempted to ameliorate the employment penalty by 
creating what he described as the first “federal certificate of 
rehabilitation.”72 His stated hope was that the certificate would 
demonstrate to employers that he had closely reviewed her case and 
determined she posed no risk of recidivism.73 
Doe’s case illustrates how the use of a criminal record can 
 
UNLICENSED & UNTAPPED: REMOVING BARRIERS TO STATE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES FOR 
PEOPLE WITH RECORDS 6 (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Unlicensed-Untapped-
Removing-Barriers-State-Occupational-Licenses.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LTS-AXHU] (noting 
that one-quarter of American workers require occupational licenses and explaining how 
misdemeanor convictions can pose a barrier). 
 64. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that defense attorneys must advise 
defendants if a plea will trigger mandatory deportation). 
 65. See Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 66. Id. at 433–44. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 434. 
 69. See id. at 434–39. 
 70. See id. In some instances, she obtained a nursing job only to be fired after the employer 
conducted a mandatory background check. Id. at 428. 
 71. Id. at 429. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 441–42. 
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undercut the state’s rationales for punishment, such as retribution or 
deterrence. Assuming deterrence works,74 criminal punishment ought 
to be proportionate to the offense. One view of criminal sanctions is 
that they are meant to be more of a deterrent than civil sanctions. 
According to this view, “criminal law works as a ‘backup’ . . . [when] 
civil sanctions are likely to prove ineffective.”75 This view assumes that 
defendants need to have a way of predicting penalties to be deterred. 
This assumption, however, does not hold when defendants face hidden 
civil penalties.76 This dynamic also works against retributive rationales 
for punishment. If the criminal penalty alone is meant to punish the 
defendant, then the combined impact of civil and criminal penalties 
risks going well beyond what would be retributively justified. As Judge 
Gleeson put it: 
I sentenced Doe to incarceration and supervision to punish her for 
committing a federal offense, to deter her from breaking the law 
again—and to help her achieve the latter goal. It seems that the 
sentence had its intended effect; aside from the conviction in this case, 
Doe’s record is clean.77 
The sentencing goals—retribution and deterrence—had been met; 
from his perspective, the employment penalty was “piling on.” 
Employers, however, had reason to view the health fraud 
conviction as a good proxy for her fitness to work as a nurse. This was 
particularly true in Doe’s case, since her conviction also triggered 
professional discipline and a temporary suspension of her nursing 
license.78 These two red flags—the conviction plus the professional 
discipline based on the conviction—effectively rendered her 
unemployable as a nurse. Employers may not have intended their 
decision not to hire Doe to function as punishment, but from Doe’s 
 
 74. There is a large literature calling into question whether deterrence works at all. See, e.g., 
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 416 (1999) (offering 
reasons why deterrence arguments “draw incessant fire from academic theorists”).  
 75. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 786 (1997); see also Jules L. Coleman, Crimes, Kickers, and 
Transaction Structures, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 313, 318 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (“In this view, the criminal law is parasitic upon tort law: crimes 
are defined in terms primarily of torts. Criminal sanctions are ‘kickers’ imposed in addition to tort 
liability to foster compliance.”). 
 76. Prescott, supra note 7, at 1046–47 (explaining that, in principle, offenders need to have a 
way to predict the consequences of committing a crime in order to be deterred). 
 77. Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 441. 
 78. The professional discipline was based only on the conviction, not on any misconduct 
during the scope of her employment. Id. at 434–35. 
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perspective and the perspective of the sentencing judge, it did. 
In the criminal justice system, sentencing judges wield significant 
power. They can decide whether a defendant will end up in prison. 
They can determine the amount of restitution she will have to pay. But 
in the absence of an effective mechanism for expunging criminal 
records, judges exercise no similar control over how other actors treat 
criminal records. In Doe’s case, employers could choose to rely on the 
certificate of rehabilitation, but it carries no legal weight. 
Enmeshed civil and criminal penalties also matter because they 
undermine the efficacy of existing institutional checks on law 
enforcement decisions. Criminal procedure is meant to guard against 
overreach by law enforcement. But it plays no role in regulating how 
private actors or civil legal institutions rely on arrests or convictions. In 
addition, civil penalties create the possibility for enforcement actions 
designed to skirt the requirements of criminal procedure. For instance, 
police who prioritize deportation may work with immigration 
enforcement officials and prioritize arrests that they suspect will result 
in deportation, regardless of whether criminal charges are pursued.79 
Or prosecutors may work with immigration enforcement officials to 
avoid Miranda requirements.80 The availability of the civil sanction can 
magnify criminal law enforcement power. 
Thus, for all the time, expense, and resources law enforcement 
institutions invest in processing cases and determining dispositions, 
they determine only one aspect of the reach of the criminal penalty. 
The criminal justice system generates criminal records, but other 
institutions play a key role in determining the impact of those records. 
The next Section turns to why it is that so many actors find criminal 
records to be valuable. 
B. Institutional Incentives 
In theory, criminal law is meant to fulfill a public purpose; it is not 
meant to be a “free market where private parties vie for goods and 
 
 79. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, 
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1845 (2011) (arguing 
that in the case of immigration enforcement, “[f]rom the arresting officer’s point of view, [an] 
arrest remains meaningful in that the effort and resources devoted to the arrest lead to a tangible 
result, even if that result is civil removal rather than a criminal conviction”). 
 80. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1308–13 (2010) 
(discussing how criminal law enforcement officials and immigration enforcement officials may 
coordinate and share information in ways that “disrupt Miranda’s practical application”).  
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services with their own dollars.”81 In practice, however, many actors—
police, prosecutors, local court officials, bail companies, private 
probation companies, criminal database providers, and myriad 
others—pursue arrests, and they create and disseminate criminal 
records not for public reasons, but for private ones. They create and 
use criminal records to achieve their own goals more quickly and 
cheaply. 
This process is facilitated by the mark of a criminal record, 
meaning the creation of official records about a person’s arrest and 
conviction history. The marking process introduces a label, “record 
holder,” or “ex-con,” that categorizes groups based on selective 
information about their prior encounters with law enforcement. This 
process is distinct from the experience of arrest and imprisonment 
itself.82 By connecting individuals to records, the marking process 
allows institutions to easily classify record-holders for their own 
purposes. In addition to the actual tangible act of creating criminal 
records, the marking process also serves a signaling function. It permits 
institutions to regulate groups in ways that serve their own objectives. 
The marking process serves multiple, and at times conflicting, 
ends. It fulfills a public purpose when it communicates a public 
pronouncement of moral condemnation or when it permits risk 
assessment. It serves a nonpublic purpose when it offers key 
institutions the opportunity to capture revenue or serve their own 
organizational incentives. Criminal records, in effect, become 
commodities. Once created, they offer a way to reduce costs, obtain 
competitive advantages, reduce potential tort liability, and efficiently 
allocate scarce resources. These are significant benefits, but they do not 
serve society at large. They may come at the expense of other 
important interests, such as proportionality in punishment and 
procedural fairness. The balance of this Section explores these 
dynamics by discussing how the marking process serves discrete 
organizational objectives both within and outside of the criminal justice 
system. 
1. Marking and Criminal Justice Decisions. In the criminal justice 
system, the marking process begins with an arrest record, which creates 
 
 81. Larkin, supra note 24, at 722.  
 82. Dolovich, supra note 19, at 237 (discussing the experience of imprisonment as 
objectifying).  
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a tangible notation of contact with the criminal justice system.83 Some 
marks are temporary, such as charges that are subsequently dismissed 
and expunged. Others are more enduring, in the form of a criminal 
conviction. 
The marking process can serve an important public safety 
function. Criminal records provide a way to conduct risk assessment 
and evaluate the propensity for future criminal activity.84 Some police 
departments prioritize low-level arrests because they subscribe to a 
“broken windows” theory of policing or because they view low-level 
arrests as a way to collect data on groups of individuals over time.85 
The marking process also serves nonpublic interests. It permits a 
host of actors to use the negative “credential” of a criminal record in 
ways that serve their own organizational interests.86 One way this 
occurs is through law enforcement appropriation of criminal records as 
a means of generating revenue. 
Profit-driven police tactics received national attention after the 
U.S. Department of Justice issued its 2015 report on policing practices 
in Ferguson, Missouri.87 The report depicted a criminal justice system 
permeated by both racial bias and financial considerations.88 High-level 
 
 83. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. 
SOC. 351, 353 (2013) (noting the marking process “involves the generation, maintenance, and 
regular use of official records about a person’s criminal justice contacts for critical decisions” by 
law enforcement, such as about what type of disposition to offer). 
 84. In the early 1990s, Professors Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon described the “new 
penology” as turning away from “responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention 
and treatment of the individual offender” and instead being preoccupied with “techniques to 
identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness.” Malcom M. Feeley & 
Jonathon Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its 
Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992). 
 85. See Ferguson, supra note 42, at 395 (discussing how collecting data on individuals 
perceived to be high risk can help police use resources efficiently and address crime proactively). 
For a related argument in the context of prosecutorial behavior, see Issa Kohler-Hausmann, 
Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 644–49 (2014) (prosecutors 
use repeated contacts with the criminal justice system as a way to “manage” defendants over 
time). 
 86. See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 4–5 (2007). 
 87. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2015) 
[hereinafter DOJ Report on Ferguson]; Editorial Op-Ed, The Problem Is Bigger Than Ferguson, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015) (describing how municipalities target poor and minority communities 
for low-level offenses to drive revenue). 
 88. DOJ Report on Ferguson, supra note 87, at 2. Police officers brought charges against 
African Americans for purported offenses such as “Manner of Walking,” failing to wear a seatbelt 
in a parked car, and even for “Making a False Declaration” for giving the short form of name—
for example “Mike” instead of “Michael.” Id. at 3, 62. The report also included additional 
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police officials repeatedly instructed officers to focus on revenue 
generation and to make up for budget shortfalls through ticket-
writing.89 
While Ferguson has become perhaps the best-known example, it 
is hardly unique in relying on low-level arrests to generate revenue.90 
One criticism of order-maintenance or data-driven policing is that it 
incentivizes high-volume arrests as a way to demonstrate officer 
productivity. Departments that fail to meet the prior year’s quota can 
run the risk of budget cuts. John Eterno, a former NYPD police 
captain, offered this criticism: “[O]fficers are challenged to match or 
exceed what they did the previous year, month and week. Words like 
‘productivity’ are code for quotas. Supervisors must exceed last year’s 
‘productivity.’”91 Departments send cues to officers that the high-
volume low-level arrests will be rewarded, which in turn, drive officers 
to engage in precisely those types of arrests. In some cases, as in 
Ferguson, pressure to collect fines, meet quotas, or seize assets leads to 
unlawful behavior.92 
Once arrest records are created, financial incentives affect case 
processing and disposition. The vast majority of states impose “user 
fees” for services commonly understood to be part of criminal justice 
expenditures, such as for use of a public defender, for “room and 
board” for jail and prison, and for the arrested individual’s probation 
and parole supervision.93 Criminal courts seek revenue from arrested 
 
evidence of racial bias, such as the disproportionate use of force against African Americans and 
emails containing racial epithets. Id. at 5. 
 89. Id. at 2 (“City Finance Director wrote to Chief Jackson that ‘unless ticket writing ramps 
up significantly before the end of the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections next 
year. . . . Given that we are looking at a substantial sales tax shortfall, it’s not an insignificant 
issue.’”). 
 90. See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM–HOW 
TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 9–10 (2015); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the 
Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 350 (2014). 
 91. John A. Eterno, Opinion, Policing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2012) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/opinion/the-nypds-obsession-with-numbers.html [https://
perma.cc/V4JD-YKYJ]. 
 92. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 80 (noting that one officer testified in a California police 
misconduct case that the pressure to meet quotas led officers in his unit to behave “more or less 
like a wolf pack” and take “anything and everything we saw on the street corner”). 
 93. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1175, 1185–96 (2014) (surveying legal financial obligations); Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 
65 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2013) (“Just as guests in a hotel must pay . . . for their travel to and from 
the hotel and to participate in activities during their stay, inmates are increasingly saddled with 
many, even most, of the costs related to the process of convicting, detaining, and releasing 
them.”); Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor are Paying the Price, N.P.R. (May 19, 2014), 
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individuals through booking fees at the time of arrest, bail 
administrative fees, dismissal fees, public defender application fees, 
court fees, disability and translation fees, jail and administrative fees, 
and postconviction fees.94 In Florida, courts charge fees of at least $50 
for misdemeanors and $100 for felonies.95 North Carolina charges $200 
for failing to appear in court, $25 for late payment of a court fine, and 
$20 for setting up an installment payment plan.96 Illinois permits judges 
to assess a 15 percent penalty on late payments, plus a 30 percent 
collection fee.97 A number of states also charge for using legal services. 
Two-thirds of states, for instance, permit judges to charge defendants 
for at least a portion of the cost of their own public defender.98 
From the perspective of the defendant, the fees function as an 
extension of the criminal justice penalty. In an egregious example, a 
Pennsylvania defendant ended up owing $2,464—over three times the 
amount of her original fine—in hidden fees.99 The locality charged over 
twenty-six separate fees, broken down into itemized expenses such as 
“Automation Fee,” “Sheriff Costs,” “Postage Fee,” “Police 
Transport,” “Drug Fee,” “Plea [Bargain Fee],” and “Police Drug Fee,” 
among others.100 While this case is an outlier, even far smaller dollar 
amounts can be insurmountable for the poor.101 
The fees create incentives for localities to run the criminal justice 
system like a business, one that creates value through imposing costs, 
tracking payments, and imposing additional sanctions for failure to 
pay. The risk is that arrest decisions are based on the institution’s own 
 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor [https://
perma.cc/HQ6G-7CA3] (stating that forty-three states and the District of Columbia permit 
defendants to be billed for a public defender, forty-one states permit inmates to be “charged room 
and board for jail and prison stays,” and in at least forty-four states, “offenders can get billed for 
their own probation and parole supervision”); see also Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking 
Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 746–50 (2017) (discussing how distribution schemes 
for public defenders do not effectively allocate resources to the indigent). 
 94. Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the 
Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1492–1503 (2016). 
 95. ALICIA BANNON, REBEKAH DILLER & MITALI NAGRECHA, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 7 (2010).  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
 98. ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR 
THE POOR 42 (2016).  
 99. BANNON ET AL., supra note 95, at 1, 9. 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Colgan, supra note 90, at 293 (discussing tradeoffs poor debtors make in paying the 
criminal justice debt or paying for necessities). 
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organizational interest in generating revenue, rather than public 
considerations about safety. This is particularly true when the fees 
directly fund the criminal justice system. In Arizona, the majority of 
criminal court surcharges go to a “criminal justice enhancement 
fund.”102 In Allegan County, Michigan, the fees go toward “the salaries 
of court employees, for heat, telephones, copy machines and even to 
underwrite the cost of the county employees’ fitness gym.”103 An 
Allegan County court administrator put it this way: “The only reason 
that the court is . . . doing business at that point in time is because that 
defendant has come in and is a user of those services. [The defendants] 
don’t necessarily see themselves as customer[s] because, obviously, 
they’re not choosing to be there. But in reality they are.”104 
These funding incentives can operate to set a dollar amount on 
avoiding the mark of a criminal conviction. A recent federal lawsuit 
challenging practices in Woodridge, Illinois, is illustrative. The 
plaintiff, who was arrested on misdemeanor shoplifting charges, was 
required to pay a $30 fee simply for the arrest and booking procedure. 
He then had to pay an additional $785 for a year-long period of court 
supervision. All charges were dismissed at the end of the year, but he 
did not receive any of his money back.105 Paying the fee is a necessary 
condition of engaging in court supervision and avoiding the mark of a 
criminal conviction. 
Financial incentives can lead to the overuse of probation, which 
currently affects twice as many people as incarceration.106 Some 
probation services are completely privatized. A recent report 
estimated that in Georgia alone, probation companies earned at least 
$40 million in revenue from fees charged to probationers.107 A single 
 
 102. HARRIS, supra note 98, at 42. 
 103. Shapiro, supra note 93.  
 104. Christina Hoag, Jailing Debtors: Should People Be Jailed for Unpaid Fines?, 26 CQ 
RESEARCHER 745, 747–48 (2016), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/getpdf.php?id=
cqresrre2016091600 [https://perma.cc/T7WW-SAG2] (discussing the case of Frederick 
Cunningham, who was ordered to pay $1000 in “court costs” for forging a prescription).  
 105. Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(plurality opinion) (per curiam). 
 106. Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 
104 GEO. L.J. 291, 292 (2016) (citing approximately four million people are on probation as 
opposed to 2.2 million incarcerated); Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in 
Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 930 (2016). 
 107. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-
FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 4 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/N29L-WLRX]. 
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company earned an estimated $1 million from a single court in Dekalb 
County, Georgia.108 Probation companies typically enter “flat fee” 
contracts with the locality, meaning that the probationer must pay a 
flat fee for supervision, separate and apart from any fines owed as part 
of the punishment.109 The typical fee in Georgia is $35 per month.110 In 
Montana, the fees can be as high as $100 per month.111 
Private probation companies are motivated by their bottom line, 
just like any other business. They have incentives to treat those on 
probation as debtors. They have incentives to impose late fees for 
missed payments as a matter of course, rather than asking whether the 
fees serve the public interest. One judge, in evaluating these practices, 
described probation as a “judicially sanctioned extortion racket.”112 
Similar incentives lead to the overuse of money bail. The bail bond 
industry collects an estimated $1.4 billion a year in revenue annually.113 
For-profit bail agents charge a nonrefundable fee of approximately 10 
percent of the bond amount, and at times, charge a higher percentage 
for low bail amounts.114 For the arrested individual, the fees are a sunk 
cost that must be paid regardless of whether the charges are 
dismissed.115 For bail bondsman, however, the fees are simply income. 
Federal funding incentives also play a role in shaping the types of 
records police officers generate. As a general matter, localities have 
significant discretion to define and pursue their own law enforcement 
objectives. Yet federal funding incentives lead police to prioritize 
 
 108. Id.at 17. 
 109. Id.at 23–24. 
 110. Id. at 24. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Terry Carter, Privatized Probation Becomes a Spiral of Added Fees and Jail Time, 
A.B.A. J. (Oct. 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/probationers_prison_
privatized_supervision_becomes_a_spiral_of_added_fees_j [https://perma.cc/WF7L-RNLV] 
(quoting Shelby County Circuit Court Judge Hub Harrington). 
 113. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find 
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 18, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-
lifetime-1408415402 [https://perma.cc/9ETT-8FCZ]; Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 31  
 114. O’Donnell v. Harris City, No. CV H-16-1414, 2017 WL 1735456, at *6 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
28, 2017) (“[C]ommercial sureties in Harris County [housing the third largest jail in the United 
States] typically charge a nonrefundable premium of 10 percent of the total value of the bond, but 
for low money bail amounts, such as those at the lower end of the misdemeanor bail schedule, 
bondsmen charge a premium higher than 10 percent.”). 
 115. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 113 (discussing the case of Jose Hernandez, who was 
mistakenly arrested on sexual assault charges). The prosecutor eventually conceded that the 
police got the “wrong Jose Hernandez” and dropped the charges. In the meantime, Hernandez’s 
wife paid a bail bondsman a nonrefundable fee of $22,500 to get him out of jail. Id.  
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certain types of arrests. A federal funding program established in 1988, 
the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, is the 
“leading source of federal funding” for a range of local law 
enforcement programs, including drug enforcement.116 In exchange for 
grants, localities submit quarterly assessments that demonstrate 
productivity. Funding is tied to drug-related arrests, regardless of the 
type of drug. Marijuana arrests, which made up half of all drug arrests 
in 2013, provide one important source of revenue.117 Given the 
prevalence of marijuana use, low-level marijuana arrests are the easiest 
to make in high volume. Police departments thus have financial 
incentives to prioritize marijuana arrests, even if marijuana use itself is 
not a high crime priority, because these arrests offer a way to 
demonstrate officer productivity.118 
Similarly, federal funding incentives have the potential to affect 
how localities police immigration enforcement. In July 2017, the 
Department of Justice announced that “sanctuary” jurisdictions would 
lose their funding if they did not “change their policies and partner with 
federal law enforcement.”119 The stated goal was to threaten federal 
funding withdrawal as a means to alter local policing practices.120 
In both the context of drug enforcement and immigration 
enforcement, the threat of receiving or losing federal funding can affect 
what types of law enforcement actions are taken. It can affect the types 
of marks created by the criminal justice system in the first place. 
In addition to affecting who receives the mark of an arrest record, 
financial incentives also play an important role in the plea bargaining 
process. Well over 90 percent of criminal convictions result from guilty 
pleas rather than trials.121 As Professor Darryl Brown observes, the 
 
 116. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK & WHITE 73 (June 
2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-rel2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L67K-
DUBG]. 
 117. Id. at 101–02.  
 118. Id. at 11. 
 119. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces 
Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
Programs, (July 25, 2017) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-
immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/7TKZ-
XYEA]; Lasch et al., supra note 60 (manuscript at 11). 
 120. Some localities responded by filing suit and arguing that the threatened funding cuts 
would undermine their ability to determine how to fulfill their law enforcement priorities. Lasch 
et. al., supra note 60 (manuscript at 11–12). 
 121. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 
(2012); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2663 (2013) 
(describing Frye as making the “important statement that . . . ‘the negotiation of a plea bargain, 
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rules and rationales for plea agreements reflect an “overt, enthusiastic 
embrace—remarkably uniform across U.S. jurisdictions—of the 
market as the metaphor and framework for the law of negotiated guilty 
pleas.”122 
In theory, “parties forecast the expected sentence after trial, 
discount it by the probability of acquittal, and offer some proportional 
discount.”123 The “price” of a plea should reflect factors such as the 
defendant’s culpability and the likelihood of acquittal at trial. But plea 
bargains also reflect other interests. Prosecutors and defense attorneys 
value pleas because they keep down costs and allow them to handle 
more volume.124 Factors such as workloads, the local office’s priorities, 
and agency costs can all lead prosecutors to pursue plea bargains that 
they might not pursue if the only factor at play was the predicted 
outcome at trial.125 
In the context of misdemeanor processing, prosecutors also have 
incentives to view trial delays as desirable. In an empirical study of New 
York misdemeanor courts, Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann explores 
this dynamic and argues that one function of misdemeanor processing 
is to “construct a record of criminal justice encounters” and thus 
“determine over time who is low risk and who is high risk, and thus in 
need of closer monitoring and perhaps formal sanctioning in the 
future.”126 
Put differently, lost time—the time a criminal case is pending 
before it proceeds to trial or reaches a disposition—is not merely an 
externality of the criminal justice process. It can be purposeful. In New 
York misdemeanor courts, it provides a way for prosecutors to monitor 
risk. By keeping criminal cases pending, prosecutors gain the 
opportunity to monitor defendants over time and to gather information 
about their behavior. If the defendant is not rearrested while the case 
is pending, the prosecutor is more likely to drop minor charges. If, 
however, the defendant is arrested again while the case is open, that 
additional arrest provides more information for the prosecutor 
 
rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant” (quoting 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407)). 
 122. DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND 
LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 91 (2015). 
 123. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2464 (2004).  
 124. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 535. 
 125. Bibas, supra note 123, at 2464. 
 126. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 85, at 624.  
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regarding the defendant’s purported risk. Prosecutors thus use lengthy 
delays as part of a strategy to “manage” defendants, rather than to 
adjudicate charges at trial.127 They deliberately lengthen how long the 
mark of an arrest is present, because they view it as a valuable way to 
determine whether or not to seek the more enduring mark of a criminal 
conviction. 
Some prosecutors also obtain financial benefits through case 
processing. Some localities hire private lawyers to work as public 
prosecutors. In Ferguson, Missouri, for instance, the local prosecutors 
were “private lawyers who charged the city by the hour and faced no 
cap on how much they could bill.”128 This creates an obvious risk: 
prosecutors whose paychecks rise directly with the number of cases 
they file have incentives to file more cases to inflate their pay, 
regardless of the public’s interest.129 
Prosecutors in some localities also profit from diversion. 
Diversion is intended to offer a way for defendants charged with minor 
offenses, such as writing bad checks, to avoid a criminal conviction.130 
In practice, however, some programs are also a source of revenue. An 
investigation into diversion practices in Houston County, Alabama, 
found that the diversion practices generated one million dollars for the 
local prosecutor’s office over the course of five years.131 
In another program, California prosecutors essentially rented 
their letterhead to third-party debt collectors, who threatened criminal 
charges against consumers who bounce checks at retailers such as 
Walmart and Target.132 The letters bore a district attorney’s seal and 
signature but had never been reviewed by a prosecutor, nor had there 
ever been an independent determination that the recipient intended to 
defraud.133 The monetary amounts of the bad checks were typically 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN 128 (2017).  
 129. Cf. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 535 (observing that prosecutors paid by the hour “would find 
it in their interest to trump up charges in order to inflate their pay”). 
 130. Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-
diversion.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/2Y6E-7L6X] 
 131. Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, Alabama Prosecutor Sets the Penalties and Fills the 
Coffers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/alabama-
prosecutor-valeska-criminal-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/3FSW-H4XN]. 
 132. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prosecutors, Debt Collectors Find a Partner, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/business/in-prosecutors-debt-collectors-
find-a-partner.html?_r=2&hp [https://perma.cc/3RQU-2DTT]. 
 133. Id. 
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insignificant—less than $100.134 Private debt collectors drafted the 
letters, collected the fines, and shared a portion of the proceeds with 
the District Attorney’s office.135  
In sum, the mark of a criminal record is closely related to 
organizational objectives, particularly financial incentives. These 
incentives can skew arrest decisions away from those that would take 
place if local law enforcement agencies focused only on public safety 
concerns. Institutional incentives also affect case processing. 
Defendants who can pay fines or afford diversion are likely to receive 
a temporary mark; after the completion of the program and payment 
of the fees, the case will be dismissed. Those who cannot afford to pay 
are likely to receive a more enduring mark, in the form of a criminal 
conviction.  
2. Marking Outside the Criminal Justice System. Outside of the law 
enforcement context, criminal records continue to serve a dual role. 
The mark of a criminal record can be used for public safety reasons. It 
can prevent those who pose a safety risk from obtaining firearms or 
working in professions where they are likely to pose a danger. The 
marking process, however, also fulfills a credentialing function 
unrelated to public safety, such as when it is used as a proxy for 
characteristics an employer might value, such as reliability or good 
judgment. It offers a way to generate revenue for the background 
check industry. It also provides a way to promote regulatory 
compliance, minimize legal liability, and allocate scarce resources. 
Every state maintains a criminal record repository that contains 
identifying information about arrests.136 States either provide or sell 
these records to private background check companies, who in turn 
profit from the ubiquitous use of background checks.137 The upshot of 
all this is that one out of every three Americans appear in the criminal 
justice database.138 As the Wall Street Journal recently put it, “America 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008); Silver-Greenberg, supra 
note 132 (discussing how prosecutors in charge of diversion programs benefit financially from 
those programs).  
 136. JACOBS, supra note 39, at 37. 
 137. Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at 
the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 364 (2016) (discussing the sale of 
criminal record information). 
 138. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 113; Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice 
Emsellem, 65 Million “Need Not Apply”: The Case for Reforming Criminal Background Checks 
for Employment, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 1 (2011), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/
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has a rap sheet.”139 
The background check industry plays a key role in disseminating 
records. Like any business, background check providers profit from 
reliance on their services.140 The National Association of Professional 
Background Screeners, the trade association for commercial 
background screeners, offers a number of reasons for why employers 
and housing providers benefit from background checks. Background 
checks offer a way to ensure “compliance with housing, licensing, and 
employment laws and regulations.”141 They help employers and 
housing providers make informed decisions and mitigate risk. The 
trade association also emphasizes how background checks can promote 
business interests: “[W]e live in an electronic world where . . . negative 
publicity and headlines spread quickly. The first question posed by 
media in any workplace violence situation is whether there was a 
background check — the ‘wrong’ answer can [be] devastat[ing].”142  
Some background check providers also financially benefit by 
charging fees to remove outdated or erroneous records. For instance, 
John and Jessica Keir paid over $2000 to various background check 
providers in ultimately futile efforts to remove their mug shot and 
criminal records after they were acquitted of “keying” a car.143 
Employers and housing providers are two of the main industries 
that conduct background checks.144 Virtually all employers—92 
percent—report conducting background checks on some or all 
 
2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf [https://perma.cc/P229-BHXA] (noting that more than 
25 percent of the U.S. adult population has a criminal record). 
 139. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 113.  
 140. The profits are significant. Aaron Elstein, Background Check Industry Under Scrutiny as 
Profits Soar, CRAIN’S (June 23, 2013), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20130623/
FINANCE/306239972/background-check-industry-under-scrutiny-as-profits-soar 
[https://perma.cc/QLQ6-Y7EH] (“[One company’s] revenue has rocketed to nearly $250 million 
from just $7.5 million in 2001, for a compounded annual growth rate of 34 [percent]—1 percentage 
point more than Apple’s over the same period.”); see also JACOBS, supra note 39, at 71 (stating 
that trade association for commercial background check providers reported annual revenue at $4 
billion). 
 141. About Screening, NAT’L ASS’N PROF. BACKGROUND SCREENERS (2016), 
https://www.napbs.com/resources/about-screening/ [https://perma.cc/ N9GH-QBBV].  
 142. Id.  
 143. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 113. 
 144. The trade association for professional background screeners specifies that it was 
established to serve the interests of “companies offering employment and tenant background 
screening services.” Who We Are, NAT’L ASS’N PROF. BACKGROUND SCREENERS (2016), 
https://pubs.napbs.com/pub.cfm?id=0B0F2865-01D2-205F-7ECE-9B60FCACD74F [https:// 
perma.cc/57Z4-PVVD]. 
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employees.145 These employers report using background checks to 
combat theft, fraud, and preventing workplace violence, as well as to 
comply with state and federal law, and the desire to avoid liability for 
employee negligence.146 
As employers recognize, a complex web of federal, state, and local 
laws and regulations mandates that agencies and private actors check 
criminal records and deny certain opportunities to criminal record-
holders. Employers are also responsible for torts committed by their 
employees within the scope of employment.147 In addition, under 
negligent retention and hiring laws, employers may be responsible for 
employee misconduct if they failed to foresee that the employee posed 
a risk.148 Criminal records offer a way to identify employee propensity 
for misconduct. Background checks can help employers learn if a 
potential worker poses a safety risk, and they can help employers 
comply with regulations that prohibit record-holders from working in 
certain industries.149 
Public housing administrators have similar incentives. By 
conducting background checks at the time a housing application is 
submitted and by engaging in ongoing screening of arrest activity, they 
gain a way to comply with federal regulations and to screen for 
dangerous tenants.150 
 
 145. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 6; see also SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. 
MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING – THE USE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING 
DECISIONS 2 (2012), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys
/pages/criminalbackgroundcheck.aspx [https://perma.cc/A6NH-3RK3] (reporting close to 70 
percent of surveyed employers conduct background checks on all job applicants). 
 146. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 6; see also SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. 
MGMT., supra note 145, at 6 (noting that surveyed employers reported the primary reasons for 
conducting background checks include negligent hiring liability, ensuring safe work environment, 
preventing theft, compliance with applicable state law, and evaluating the overall trustworthiness 
of the applicant). 
 147. Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 1982) (discussing respondeat superior liability 
for torts that occur within the scope of employment); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment 
Law, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15–16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2944840 [https://perma.cc/V4EA-AP2P] (collecting cases discussing the 
doctrine of respondeat superior in the context of background checks). 
 148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (noting that in 
some cases an employer may risk liability if he continues to employ those “who, to [the 
employer’s] knowledge, are in the habit of misconducting themselves in a manner dangerous to 
others”). 
 149. Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels, Statutory Limitations on Civil Rights of People 
with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1501, 1503–05 (2003) (outlining several such 
regulations). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012) (indicating that admission may be denied to those who have 
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The interests in complying with regulations, avoiding liability, or 
promoting safety, however, do not fully explain how employers and 
housing providers actually use criminal records. For one, employers 
and housing providers routinely impose bans that are broader than 
required (or even permitted) by law. For instance, some housing 
providers bar applicants whose only criminal histories are low-level 
arrests that did not result in conviction.151 Some also evict entire 
households after one member’s arrest,152 and they engage in 
disqualifications based simply on the existence of a criminal record, 
rather than conducting an individualized assessment of risk.153 
Overbroad bans create the risk of violating antidiscrimination laws. 
Criminal records are not race neutral. African American and Hispanic 
men are arrested at rates significantly higher than whites.154 Blanket 
 
“engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal activity or other criminal activity which would 
adversely affect the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other 
residents”). 
 151. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, GUIDANCE ON 
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY 
PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 1–2 (2016) [hereinafter 
HUD Office of General Counsel Guidance], https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/
HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF [https://perma.cc/7YSN-XVCD] (noting that 
formerly incarcerated individuals encounter significant barriers to housing, and that in some 
cases, individuals are barred merely because of prior arrests that did not result in conviction); see 
also Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race 
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 491 (2010) (citing examples of statutes, ordinances, and 
policies which penalize citizens arrested but not convicted); See generally AUSTIN/TRAVIS 
COUNTY REENTRY ROUNDTABLE, LOCKED OUT: CRIMINAL HISTORY BARRIERS TO 
AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING IN AUSTIN & TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS (2016), 
http://www.reentryroundtable.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Criminal-Background-White-
Paper.final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFN4-D5DM]; MARIE CLAIRE TRAN LEUNG, WHEN 
DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL, FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (2015), 
http://povertylaw.org/files/docs/WDMD-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XDG-EUZ5]. 
 152. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002) (upholding a “one-
strike” eviction policy, which permits eviction of entire households from public housing based on 
the off-premises, nonviolent drug arrest of a single member). 
 153. Both the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the EEOC 
have warned against the overbroad use of criminal records, including arrests not resulting in 
convictions. See HUD Office of General Counsel Guidance, supra note 151, at 2, 5–6; EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 8–20 (discussing disparate impact liability for overbroad 
bans); see also Lahny R. Silva, Criminal Histories in Public Housing, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 375, 387 
(2015) (discussing lack of individualized assessment of criminal record history in the public 
housing context). 
 154. Brame, supra note 23, at 478; EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 3 (citing 
statistics that “1 in 17 White men are expected to serve time in prison during their lifetime; by 
contrast, this rate climbs to 1 in 6 for Hispanic men; and to 1 in 3 for African American men” 
(citations omitted)).  
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bans run the risk of having a disparate impact on a protected class.155 
For easily replaced workers, employers might view a “no hire” 
strategy as the best approach to criminal records, given the perceived 
complexity of the regulatory landscape surrounding criminal 
background checks. Employers might perceive an overbroad ban as 
more time efficient than meeting with prospective employees, 
reviewing their records, and determining if they actually pose a risk.156 
In an influential sociological study, Professor Devah Pager found that 
employers spent very little time engaging in an individualized 
assessment of entry-level workers. Rather, the presence of a nonviolent 
drug conviction itself significantly reduced access to jobs such as wait 
staff, service workers, warehouse workers, delivery drivers, or kitchen 
staff.157 The presence of the record itself reduced callbacks for whites 
by 50 percent—meaning that half the time, “employers were unwilling 
to consider equally qualified applicants simply on the basis of their 
criminal background.”158 For African Americans, a criminal record 
presented an even more severe disadvantage. Only one out of three 
black applicants with a criminal record received a callback.159 
Overwhelmingly, employers chose to eliminate applicants on the 
presence of the criminal record alone, rather than taking the time to 
call references or inquire further into the nature of the conviction.160 
 
 155. Id. at 8–20. 
 156. This dynamic is not limited to the criminal justice context—it is the product of 
technological changes that permit an ever-broader array of actors to obtain information about 
individuals and to use them to make other decisions. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank 
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2014) (discussing algorithms that score individuals by various metrics and use them to evaluate 
decisions such as hiring a job candidate to the likelihood of prison recidivism); Ferguson, supra 
note 42, at 333 (“Just as law enforcement agencies now collect and electronically analyze more 
personal data, so do private, third-party organizations.”); Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2015) (“Database screening and digital watchlisting systems are 
increasingly used to determine who can work, vote, fly, etc.”); Anil Kalhan, Immigration 
Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (discussing how immigration control has become an 
“information-centered and technology-driven enterprise . . . [that subjects] both noncitizens and 
U.S. citizens . . . to collection and analysis of extensive quantities of personal information for 
immigration control and other purposes”).  
 157. See PAGER, supra note 86, at 68.  
 158. Id. Pager used matched pairs of white and black college students as “testers,” who were 
given identical resumes. Id. at 67.  
 159. Id. at 69. 
 160. Id. at 68. Pager did find some exceptions to the overall trend that criminal records served 
as disqualifiers. For instance, in one case, an employer discouraged a white tester with no criminal 
record from applying for a cleaning job because it involved “a great deal of dirty work,” but then 
offered a tester with a criminal record the job “on the spot.” Id.  
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Some companies also require long-time employees to submit to 
background checks, and they fire those who do not have clean criminal 
records.161 This approach is overbroad; it is not reasonably related to a 
business necessity.162 This is particularly true for long-time employees 
with a demonstrated work history. The decision reflects an 
administrative judgment that it is cheaper to hire others than to make 
an individualized determination about risk. It may also reflect a 
seemingly race-neutral reason for what is in fact employment 
discrimination based on race. 
Employers and housing providers may also rely on criminal 
records because they want to identify groups that deserve scarce 
resources. Public housing provides one example. There is a serious 
shortage of public housing. Approximately 4.6 million federally 
subsidized housing units are available for 45 million people living at or 
below the federal poverty line.163 Background checks serve as a fast, 
inexpensive way to choose applicants and deselect others. The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) “One 
Strike and You’re Out” policy uses criminal background histories as a 
way to select recipients of scarce resources. It states that the policy 
offers a reasonable way to “allocate scarce resources to those who play 
by the rules” as well as to promote community safety.164 The criminal 
record is used as a proxy for undesirability.165 Landlords use criminal 
records to establish which applications ought to be prioritized, as well 
as to make risk assessments. 
 
 161. EEOC Press Release, supra note 59 (discussing a consent decree with BMW after an 
EEOC finding that such a policy disproportionately harmed African American workers).  
 162. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 1–2. 
 163. Silva, supra note 153, at 379; see also CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. 
PROCTOR, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2013, at 12 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/ 
publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VFL-PE4V] (showing 45 million people 
at or below poverty line); Who Lives in Federally Assisted Housing?: Characteristics of 
Households Assisted by HUD Programs, HOUS. SPOTLIGHT, Nov. 2012, at 1, http://nlihc.org/
sites/default/files/HousingSpotlight2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DLX6-EDPS] (4.6 million federally 
subsidized housing units). 
 164. U.S. HOUS. & URBAN DEV., “ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT” POLICY IN PUBLIC 
HOUSING 3 (1996), reprinted in OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., NOTICE PIH 96-16 (HA), “ONE 
STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT” SCREENING AND EVICTION GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING 
AUTHORITIES (HAS) (1996).  
 165. Douglas Martin, Innocent People Lose Homes: Law’s Strange Twist, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
11, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/11/nyregion/about-new-york-innocent-people-lose-
homes-law-s-strange-twist.html [https://perma.cc/B4TW-JA2R] (“‘People who commit crimes 
have no right to public housing,’ [former HUD official] Ms. [Laura] Blackburne said before her 
resignation. ‘Why should I keep some creep in there who doesn’t care about decent living?’”). 
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In sum, the mark of a criminal record is widely valued, not only 
for public purposes—deterring crime—but also for other ends. It 
serves a credentialing function, and it permits a host of industries to 
make hiring decisions in a way they perceive as cost-effective. 
C. Regulatory Oversight 
Even though low-level criminal records are widely created and 
disseminated, key aspects of the process are not subject to meaningful 
oversight. The problem is not only that “sloppy” misdemeanor courts 
do not provide meaningful access to defense counsel or comport with 
the requirements of criminal procedure.166 It is also that agencies 
making misdemeanor-justice decisions pursue their own interests, but 
no one considers how those decisions affect society at large. 
First, there is of course no single agency tasked with mediating the 
impact of low-level arrest decisions. Harm from criminal justice 
decisions stems from a variety of different sources, but no one 
examines how those harms aggregate and whether the combined 
impact of civil and criminal consequences serves societal interests. Part 
of the problem is information deficits. It is hard to predict at the time 
of an arrest how that arrest may spiral in in unanticipated ways. 
Defendants who agree to probation or diversion programs may be 
overoptimistic about their ability to comply with the requisite 
conditions, including payments. Once a payment plan is in place, 
defendants may be unable to modify it if they find the payments 
unmanageable. 
Second, criminal law enforcement agencies at times lack 
incentives to gather data and examine the efficacy of policies geared 
toward collecting criminal justice debt. Law enforcement agencies have 
incentives to demonstrate productivity, but they lack similar incentives 
to collect data that considers the full social cost of certain law 
enforcement tactics.167 A 2010 study examining the low-level criminal 
justice process in fifteen different states found that not one state system 
 
 166. Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, supra note 36, at 1063–64 (“[The] massive, 
influential [misdemeanor justice] apparatus does not obey the standard rules of criminal law and 
procedure. Unlike its felony counterpart, the misdemeanor arena is severely underregulated, 
informal, and sloppy.”). 
 167. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 361 
(2004) (arguing that criminal law enforcement officials have incentives to avoid knowledge 
“about the social costs of enforcement” because “[a]s long as those costs remain hidden, the net 
benefits of enforcement, for which enforcement officials get political credit, appear more 
substantial”). 
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had any organized way of measuring the efficacy of criminal justice 
fines.168 This lack of oversight extended to tracking the costs of criminal 
debt collection.169 This means that even as these agencies pursued 
policies based on perceived financial incentives, they lacked crucial 
information about the financial efficacy of those policies.170 
Ineffective oversight of criminal record data itself contributes to 
the problem. The FBI adds between 10,000 and 12,000 new names to 
its criminal record database every day.171 There are approximately 80 
million individuals in the database altogether.172 Despite being easy to 
access, these records consist of notoriously bad data.173 Criminal 
records repositories are rife with inaccuracies and mistaken identity 
information, as well as old, expunged, and dismissed arrest records. 
Nearly 50 percent of the records in the FBI database are incomplete.174 
Correcting mistaken criminal records can be extremely difficult. 
The most disturbing instances of this phenomenon arise for those who 
have been “jailed by mistake.”175 In Los Angeles, more than 1480 
people were arrested due to inaccurate records over a five-year 
period.176 In St. Louis, residents who had been mistakenly arrested due 
to common names collectively spent more than 2000 days in jail from 
 
 168. BANNON ET AL., supra note 95, at 10–11. 
 169. Id. at 10. 
 170. Id. at 10–13.  
 171. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 113. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. 
REV. 321, 344. 
 174. MAURICE EMSELLEM & MADELINE NEIGHLY, WANTED: ACCURATE FBI 
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 3 (2013), http://www.nelp.org/publication/wanted-
accurate-fbi-background-checks-for-employment/ [https://perma.cc/8EAQ-EWZ7] (reporting 
that fifty percent of criminal records in the FBI database are incomplete); see also Adam Liptak, 
Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/10/17/us/17expunge.html [http://perma.cc/7MNT-DYFW] (explaining that such 
incomplete records persist in commercial electronic databases).  
 175. Robert Patrick & Jennifer S. Mann, Jailed by Mistake, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 
26, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/special/st-louis-wrongful-arrests-mount-as-
fingerprint-mismatches-are-ignored/html_b153a232-208f-5d0b-86a1-ba3256f7a941.html [http://
perma.cc/2GRQ-XCEN]. 
 176. Robert Faturechi & Jack Leonard, ID Errors Put Hundreds in County Jail, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/25/local/la-me-wrong-id-20111225 
[http://perma.cc/MY73-RBVY]; see also Dan Frosch, Mistaken Identity Cases at Heart of Denver 
Lawsuit over Wrongful Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/
us/lawsuit-in-denver-over-hundreds-of-mistaken-arrests.html [http://perma.cc/W8ZP-432C] 
(reporting systemic cases of mistaken arrest warrant information, based on common names or 
misspellings). 
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2005 to 2013, or an average of about three weeks each.177 One man 
alone was imprisoned for 211 days.178 Similar dynamics occur with civil 
penalties, with people being wrongfully denied access to public 
housing, to employment, or being held in immigration custody on the 
basis of an inaccurate or incomplete record.179 Despite these well-
documented problems with criminal record data, there is no agency 
tasked with systemically checking criminal records and ensuring 
accuracy. 
By contrast, law enforcement agencies publish considerable data 
about how many criminal records they produce. Policymakers can state 
with certainty how many people are incarcerated at any given time. 
They can track how many people are convicted of particular offenses. 
They can compare sentence lengths. But there is no similar way of 
tracking the consequences of criminal records. There is no database 
that shows how many people with minor records have been denied 
access to work as a result of those records. Lack of effective oversight 
of criminal records necessarily means that, to some extent, the scope of 
the problem remains hidden, and it remains more difficult to address. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MISDEMEANOR REFORM 
For the low-level offenses that constitute the bulk of state court 
workloads, the overcriminalization problem is not confined to 
overbroad laws and to policies that are excessively punitive by design. 
Rather, it is also the product of flawed institutional incentives. In the 
aggregate, criminal justice penalties can cause enormous and 
unjustified harm. But when viewed at the micro-level, as a series of 
discrete choices, they also create powerful benefits for key institutions. 
This dynamic affects criminal justice reform in several ways. First, 
it means that criminal justice reform will require identifying and 
responding to the incentives of key institutions with an interest in 
maintaining the system as it is. Identifying stakeholders is necessary to 
determining whether criminal justice decisions are actually fulfilling 
their intended public purpose, or whether they are instead merely 
 
 177. Patrick & Mann, supra note 175. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.; Silva, supra note 153, at 386, 389 (describing inaccuracies in criminal record data that 
affect access to public housing); Eyder Peralta, You Say You’re an American, But What if You 
Had to Prove It or Be Deported?, NPR (Dec. 22, 2016, 12:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2016/12/22/504031635/you-say-you-re-an-american-but-what-if-you-had-to-prove-it-
or-be-deported [https://perma.cc/EJE9-XQVM]. 
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serving the organizational interests of discrete actors. Second, it also 
affects the methods by which scholars demonstrate the need for 
criminal justice reform. One important method of triggering reform is 
cost-benefit analysis, which has been influential in demonstrating that 
punishment should not be imposed when its societal costs outweigh its 
societal benefits. This type of aggregate cost-benefit analysis, however, 
may be of limited use in the context of misdemeanors and collateral 
consequences. Stakeholders have incentives to use criminal records in 
ways that serve their own interests, regardless of the cost to society as 
a whole. This Part considers these dynamics, and it then preliminarily 
evaluates possibilities for either reducing the influence of stakeholders 
or realigning their incentives with those of the state. 
A. Identifying Stakeholders 
Stakeholders—those with a vested interest in the current system—
play an important role in maintaining the misdemeanor system. Even 
as low-level arrests and convictions create significant harm for the 
poor,180 they benefit others who reap economic rewards from being 
able to rely on criminal records. These actors, in effect, become 
stakeholders in maintaining the system as it is. 
Stakeholders need not be motivated by punitive intentions. While 
some stakeholders appropriate criminal records as a race-neutral 
means of effecting decisions that are actually motivated by racial and 
socioeconomic bias,181 others do so because their primary aim is to 
pursue their own objectives. They are unaware of or indifferent to the 
systemic costs, or they choose to privilege their own organizational 
incentives above other concerns. 
Some stakeholders are easy to identify, such as privatized 
probation companies or the private bail bond industry. They have a 
direct financial stake in criminal justice decisions, one that is visibly at 
 
 180. See generally LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (George Steinmetz & Julia Adams eds., 2009) (arguing 
that the criminal justice system takes a punitive approach to managing the poor). 
 181. BACK ON THE ROAD CALIFORNIA, STOPPED, FINED, ARRESTED: RACIAL BIAS IN 
POLICING AND TRAFFIC COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2016), http://www.ebclc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_BOTRCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6ET-GTPB] 
(documenting racial disparities in police stops for “failure to pay” offenses in a number of cities). 
For instance, in San Francisco, where the population is 5.8 percent black, 48.7 percent of arrests 
are for a “failure to appear/pay.” Id.; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and 
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 477–
78 (2000) (showing that racial minorities in poor urban areas were disproportionately the subject 
of police stops).  
JAIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2018  2:41 PM 
2018] CAPITALIZING ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1421 
odds with the public purpose of punishment. Other stakeholders are 
more difficult to identify. They benefit in less tangible ways. They 
participate in or support the current system because they perceive it as 
promoting their interests. 
The problem is partially distributive and partially perceptual. As 
a distributive matter, the current system creates enormous value for a 
range of institutions, but its benefits are not distributed in an equitable 
way. The misdemeanor process regulates poverty, not just crime. The 
vast majority of those arrested are poor. Two-thirds of those in jail 
earned less than $12,000 in the year before their arrest.182 More than 
half of state prisoners in 1997 earned less than $1,000 in the month 
before their arrest.183 Seventy-five percent of state prisoners lack a high 
school degree.184 Racial minorities are much more likely to remain in 
jail because they cannot afford bail.185 For the poor, the impact of a 
low-level offense can be devastating. Outcomes can appear arbitrary 
and procedurally unfair. 
Policies that disproportionately affect the poor, however, may not 
appear unreasonable or punitive in the abstract. Unlike prison time, 
where judges and lawmakers can compare sentence lengths to the 
severity of the crime and determine if the outcome is grossly 
disproportionate, collateral consequences and low-level penalties are 
much harder to assess.186 The same penalty does not affect everyone 
equally. This dynamic is particularly true with fines. A system of 
escalating fines is a rational way to deter socially undesirable behavior 
for those who can afford to pay. Those who pay fines up front avoid 
hidden or escalating late fees. They are also less likely to end up with a 
 
 182. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A GUIDE FOR 
LITIGATION 5 (2016), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/confronting-criminal-
justice-debt-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QZL-39Q3]. 
 183. Butler, supra note 12, at 2181 (citing statistic showing that “35 [percent] of state inmates 
were unemployed in the month before their arrest, compared to the national unemployment rate 
of 4.9%”). 
 184. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, EDUCATION AND 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 3 (2003), https://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/collateral
consequences/images/resources/Educational_and_Correctional_Populations.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W5J2-YQ5A].  
 185. JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF 
USING MONEY FOR BAIL 2–4 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/bailfail.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9HS-67A6].  
 186. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (evaluating the “gravity of the 
offense compared to the harshness of the penalty” for purposes of determining whether a criminal 
penalty is grossly disproportionate). Gross disproportionality is a difficult standard to meet, given 
that it encompasses only “extreme sentences.” Id. at 21.  
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criminal record because they can participate in diversion programs or 
because, in some cases, prosecutors drop charges for first-time 
arrestees or those who have a work history. If they do end up with a 
criminal record, they may be less likely to experience immediate harm 
to their ability to work or to their housing prospects. Poor people are 
also far more likely to make tradeoffs with other opportunities when 
paying criminal justice debt. An indigent defendant who faces fines and 
fees might have to choose between paying for food and public 
transportation, or paying the debt. By contrast, those with the means 
to pay do not make similar tradeoffs.187 
Fines are not the only aspect of low-level penalties that 
disproportionately affect the poor. Collateral consequences triggered 
by low-level arrests can likewise have distributive effects. A single drug 
arrest can result in the eviction of an entire family from public housing, 
but it will have no impact on the family of a homeowner.188 A minor 
arrest may put a low-skilled worker out of a job, but not a skilled 
worker who is hard to replace.  
These distributive dynamics, in turn, affect perceptions about 
whether low-level arrests and their collateral consequences are 
desirable or whether they are grossly disproportionate.189 Those who 
do not experience cascading consequences may not perceive the system 
as costly. Instead, they may view the low-level criminal justice system 
as meeting objectives they value—saving money, raising revenue, 
monitoring for risk, making hiring decisions efficiently, and allocating 
scarce resources, among others. From their perspective, the marginal 
benefits of having this system may well outweigh the costs. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The influence of stakeholders affects the procedures used by 
scholars to evaluate the need for criminal justice reform. In particular, 
it affects the methodology of cost-benefit analysis, which has in recent 
years played a major role in criminal justice reform. Cost-benefit 
analysis “refer[s] to a regulatory impact assessment procedure that 
 
 187. JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR.,DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS?: THE 
HIGH COST OF FINES AND FEES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2016), 
https://debtorsprison.jlc.org/documents/JLC-Debtors-Prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MXE- 
RV4Z]. 
 188. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).  
 189. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1106, 1118-
26 (2008) (discussing how “informational and incentive” disparities create racialized bases of 
knowledge and lead blacks and whites to perceive the same experience differently). 
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calls for officials to identify the full range of effects of government 
policy, so that they have information about consequences before 
making decisions.”190 In recent years, cost-benefit analysis has been 
particularly influential in highlighting the costs of mass incarceration.191 
For instance, in response to budget constraints and the high cost of 
prison, a number of states have explored ways to save costs by reducing 
the prison population.192 In the context of mass incarceration, the costs 
are easy to see: family breakup, the price of prisons, loss of an 
otherwise accessible workforce, among others. Cost-benefit analysis in 
the criminal justice system evaluates the full range of costs of criminal 
punishment and assesses whether punishment produces corresponding 
benefits to society. But this approach to cost-benefit analysis may not 
work in spurring reform of enmeshed low-level offenses and collateral 
consequences. That is because the interests of key actors differ from 
the state’s interests in the abstract. In addition, not all actors view costs 
or benefits in the same way. 
One way to implement cost-benefit analysis is to focus on 
tradeoffs between choosing criminal sanctions versus civil sanctions in 
regulating behavior. Professor Darryl Brown explores this dynamic in 
assessing the tradeoffs between incarceration and other means of 
regulation. He argues that, too often, lawmakers fail to recognize the 
full costs of the criminal justice system, including the impact of 
incarceration on families or the labor market.193 A growing body of 
criminal law scholarship applies cost-benefit analysis to various 
contexts including bail,194 pretrial detention,195 and postconviction 
incarceration,196 and seeks to account for the full range of social harm 
triggered by criminal justice decisions. 
 
 190. Brown, supra note 167, at 348; Brown, supra note 41, at 1383 (arguing that criminal law 
theory should recognize the harm that is imposed on third parties when an offender is punished). 
 191. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 870, 892–901 (2015) (summarizing developments in applying cost-benefit analysis to the 
criminal law); see also Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal 
Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 596 (2012) (describing how awareness of “[t]he fiscal and human 
consequences” of criminal law have led to reforms designed to reduce mass incarceration). 
 192. Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 191–92, nn.4–5 & 8 
(2013) (citing examples). 
 193. Brown, supra note 167, at 348; Brown, supra note 41, at 1383 (arguing that criminal law 
theory should recognize the harm that is imposed on third parties when an offender is punished).  
 194. See Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399 (2017).  
 195. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B. U. L. REV. 1 (2017).  
 196. See David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to 
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905 (2013) (examining incarceration policy changes under the 
cost-benefit analysis framework). 
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This literature has been highly influential in identifying the costs 
of criminal justice enforcement. Some costs are borne by defendants 
and their families.197 Other costs are systemic, such as legitimacy costs. 
Policing scholars note that communities may be less likely to obey laws 
in general if they perceive policing decisions as illegitimate.198 Policing 
decisions that disproportionately affect African American 
communities can lead to legal estrangement and undermine social 
inclusion.199 Criminal justice decisions also reduce access to 
opportunity. Monetary sanctions and low-level arrests impose social 
and economic burdens and can also play a role in promoting residential 
segregation.200 
Cost-benefit analysis offers one valuable way to analyze whether 
the benefits of criminalization are worth their cost. However, this 
method of analysis may be of limited use in addressing the problems 
related to misdemeanors and collateral consequences. First, it is not 
clear that reducing the costs of law enforcement expenditures will 
necessarily reduce the size of the criminal justice system. Low-level 
arrests and fine-only offenses are already perceived as valuable, low-
cost alternatives to prison time.201 Precisely because low-level offenses 
require fewer law enforcement resources as compared to felonies, the 
state is able to process a higher volume of them.202 Thus, lowering the 
costs of law enforcement can contribute to what Professor Alexandra 
 
 197. In an empirical study on designing an optimal bail system, Professor Crystal Yang takes 
such an approach by looking expansively at the costs of pretrial detention. Professor Yang’s 
taxonomy of costs includes harm to the defendant, such as loss of freedom, the collateral 
consequences of detention such as lost productivity and disruption of the labor force, harm to 
families and communities of the incarcerated individual, as well as the administrative costs of 
detention. Yang, supra note 194. 
 198. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME 
& JUST. 283, 294–95 (2003) (“[M]inority group members are less willing to accept the decisions of 
legal authorities and less satisfied with those authorities with whom they deal.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 199. Bell, supra note 6, at 2066–67. 
 200. See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From 
Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE (2017) (discussing the effect of policing on 
residential segregation).  
 201. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/
2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/928J-V579] (discussing the need to lower costs 
by finding alternatives to incarceration). 
 202. Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 
183, 185–86 (2014) (discussing how cheaper procedures, such as substituting plea bargains for 
trials, lowers procedural costs but expands the volume of cases beyond the point considered 
optimal). 
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Natapoff describes as “net-widening”—it can expand the reach of the 
criminal justice system well beyond the point that would be considered 
optimal.203 
Second, in implementing cost-benefit analysis, the perspective 
that matters is not that of the “state” in the aggregate. Rather, it is the 
perspective of the front-line actors responsible for making key 
decisions. The institutions responsible for making cost-benefit 
assessments have incentives to prioritize their own immediate 
perceived costs and benefits but not to look to the interests of society 
at large.204 Police officers who are financially incentivized to prioritize 
low-level arrests, for instance, may fail to examine how policing 
practices harm communities and diminish police legitimacy over 
time.205 Cost-benefit analysis, in other words, only works if the 
institutions responsible for making critical law enforcement 
decisions—including decisions to arrest as well as to rely on criminal 
records—have incentives to care about the interests of society at large, 
rather than their own organizational incentives. Public institutions, 
such as the police, should have such incentives. Private actors, such as 
privatized probation companies, the bail industry, background check 
providers, and employers and landlords, by contrast, have clear 
incentives to privilege their own organizational interests. 
Another problem is that there may not be a single optimal way of 
sanctioning.206 The state’s interest in punishment is not the same as the 
interests of the institutions that exercise decisionmaking authority over 
the processes of punishment. In some cases, institutions may not agree 
over whether certain secondary effects of contact with the criminal 
justice system are “costs” versus “benefits.” 
Immigration scholars have been keenly attuned to these dynamics. 
In contrast to the criminal law’s focus on aggregate assessments of costs 
and benefits, a rich immigration-enforcement literature analyzes the 
significance of variation in the goals of various actors—federal, state, 
local, public and private actors.207 An important body of scholarship 
 
 203. Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, supra note 36, at 1059 (arguing that 
misdemeanor decriminalization leads to net-widening). 
 204. Indeed, as Darryl Brown argues, they may have incentives to actively avoid considering 
the social costs of punishment. Brown, supra note 167, at 361.  
 205. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 777 (2012); 
Harmon, supra note 191, at 873. 
 206. Steiker, supra note 75, at 780 (discussing the rise of “economic analysis of law, which 
strives for a single model of optimal sanctioning that transcends old categories”). 
 207. For selected contributions to this literature, see Ingrid Eagly, Immigrant Protective 
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discusses how immigration-enforcement actors view enforcement 
choices in strategic ways, through the lens of their own incentives and 
commitments. 
For instance, private employers who check immigration 
paperwork do not share the same goals as federal immigration 
authorities. Some employers have economic incentives to hire 
undocumented workers, whom they can underpay, and to use the 
threat of enforcement to deter those same workers from seeking to 
enforce fair labor standards.208 Some localities do not share the same 
goals as federal immigration officials; they have incentives to 
encourage immigrant workers to migrate and fulfill labor shortages, 
regardless of whether those same immigrants are targets of federal 
enforcement efforts.209 In the “crimmigration” context, both 
immigration enforcement officials and criminal law enforcement 
officials have incentives to use either the immigration-enforcement or 
criminal law enforcement system instrumentally.210 Criminal law 
enforcement actors have incentives to appropriate deportation as a 
crime-control tool when it eases prosecution, rather than based on 
considerations of whether deportation is actually appropriate.211 
Similarly, in the low-level arrest context, institutions also 
appropriate criminal justice decisions for their own purposes. From the 
perspective of the state’s sentencing goals, long delays in misdemeanor 
courts are an unintended social harm that is ancillary to the criminal 
justice process. It is a negative externality of the criminal justice 
 
Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 254—74 (2016); Jason A. Cade, Enforcing 
Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 683–98 (2015); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice 
for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1146–56 
(2013); Motomura, supra note 79 at 1858; Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent 
Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the 
Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 977–78 (2004); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance 
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 574–75 (2008) (discussing the 
federal immigration enforcement “exclusivity lie”); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1090–93 (2004).  
 208. See generally Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 1103 (2009) (detailing how employers retaliate against unauthorized employees who 
attempt to assert their employment rights); Stephen Lee, Workplace Enforcement Workarounds, 
21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 549, 552 (2012) (discussing how devolving immigration enforcement 
discretion to employers can come at the expense of protecting workers).  
 209. Rodriguez, supra note 207, at 577. 
 210. David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 157, 202 (2012) (describing “ad hoc instrumentalism” in the crimmigration context). 
 211. Id. (“Law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and immigration officials are encouraged to 
see criminal law and immigration law simply as different kinds of tools, and to use whichever tool 
works best against a particular offender or suspect.”). 
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process, one that imposes significant harm on defendants. But delays 
can also be appropriated by prosecutors as a desirable, informal form 
of punishment. Long delays also provide prosecutors with the leverage 
needed to induce defendants to take quick pleas, and they can function 
as a way to monitor defendants over time.212 Similar dynamics unfold 
with collateral consequences. Some prosecutors purposely substitute 
low-level charges that carry steep collateral consequences for more 
serious criminal charges. This allows prosecutors to save time and 
money because they do not have to gather additional evidence that 
might be required to prove a more serious case.213 
Likewise, although job loss after a criminal sentence is complete 
is commonly seen as a secondary or unintended aspect of punishment, 
some employers value criminal record checks precisely because they 
provide a way to eliminate applicants. Employers have powerful 
incentives to conduct background checks and to rely on them as proxies 
for worker fitness. Harm that arises outside of the formal criminal 
sentence is thus not merely an externality of criminal justice decisions. 
It can be appropriated by key institutions to serve their own purposes. 
As long as key decisionmakers view the current system as beneficial to 
their own organizational interests, they have incentives to maintain the 
system as it is, regardless of its societal cost. 
C. Realigning Incentives 
Recognizing the disconnect between the state’s sentencing goals 
and the interests of stakeholders leads to two potential, and frequently 
overlapping, avenues for reform. The first avenue seeks to reduce the 
influence of various institutions on criminal justice decisions. The 
second seeks to realign the incentives of key stakeholders with the 
sentencing interests of the state. This Article’s goal is not to advocate 
for either type of reform over the other, but rather to illustrate how 
existing reform proposals might fit within either avenue and to 
highlight how they might work. 
There are a number of ways to reduce the ability of different 
 
 212. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 85, at 646–47 (discussing open arrests as functioning to 
“manage” defendants over time); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 83, at 374. 
 213. Eagly, supra note 80, at 1306–19 (discussing relaxed procedural norms in immigration 
enforcement as compared to criminal enforcement, which in turn create incentives for criminal 
law prosecutors to use the immigration system instrumentally); Jain, supra note 7, at 1221–25 
(discussing the collateral enforcement model); Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 775, 795–822 (2016) (describing the practice of “strategic undercharging”); 
Sklansky, supra note 210, at 202. 
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institutions to appropriate criminal records for their own purposes. 
One is to reduce the influence of financial incentives in criminal justice 
practices altogether. In Ferguson, for instance, the consent decree 
aimed to do this by requiring that the municipality publicly post all fees, 
conduct ability-to-pay determinations, and prohibit the use of 
municipal arrests as a means to collecting civil court debt.214 Other 
reforms in this vein including removing private actors from influencing 
criminal justice decisions, such as by removing or restricting the 
influence of the bail bond industry or the privatized probation industry. 
More far-reaching approaches to limiting the number of 
stakeholders include changing the reach of the criminal law, either by 
substantive law reform or by changing front-end policing practices. 
Police and lawmakers who evaluate the full range of harms that arise 
from low-level arrest decisions may choose not to arrest, or they may 
pursue nonpenal alternatives that avoid generating a criminal record.215 
New York County prosecutors took this approach by recently 
indicating that they would routinely decline to pursue low-level 
turnstile jumping charges, which had previously been one of the top 
misdemeanor charges in Manhattan County.216 The stated goal was to 
obtain “more fair outcomes without sacrificing public safety.”217 The 
approach works by reducing the number of criminal records created in 
the first place. 
Another approach is to reduce access to criminal records. A 
number of jurisdictions have taken this approach in recent years 
through reforms such as ban-the-box, expungement, or sealing laws, 
including laws that restrict access to nonconviction records.218 The 
mechanisms vary, but as a general matter, they function by either 
removing criminal record information from state databases or by 
preventing access to criminal records under certain circumstances. 
While reducing access to criminal records is promising, this 
 
 214. Consent Decree at 83–85, United States v. Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. 
Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/833431/download [https://perma.cc/UEV8-
H4BG]. 
 215. For an exploration of this approach, see Harmon, supra note 40. 
 216. James C. McKinley, Jr., For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to Court May Be 
Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/nyregion/subway-fare-
beating-new-york.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/268U-T6SV]. 
 217. Id. (quoting Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance Jr.) 
 218. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., FOUR YEARS OF SECOND CHANCE 
REFORMS, 2013-2016: RESTORATION OF RIGHTS & RELIEF FROM COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES 2–3 (2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/4-YEARS-
OF-SECOND-CHANCE-REFORMS-CCRC.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ4W-4N7T].  
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approach faces practical obstacles to implementation. One challenge is 
underenforcement; employers who perceive records as valuable 
continue to rely on criminal history in ways that are overbroad. Some 
employers ask about criminal records even when prohibited from 
doing so, or they use internet searches to access records that have been 
expunged but remain accessible.219 Without implicit bias training, some 
research shows that hiring personnel prohibited from asking about 
criminal history may engage in racial discrimination, because they use 
race as a proxy for criminal history.220 Thus, implementing meaningful 
restrictions on the use of criminal background checks will likely require 
the state to do more than simply expunge existing criminal records.  
The second route seeks to align the incentives of existing 
stakeholders with those of the state. Some reform initiatives take this 
approach by seeking to persuade companies that it is in their business 
interest to hire record holders. They highlight research that record 
holders make more committed or motivated employees because they 
are aware that they have fewer employment options.221 The goal is for 
employers to agree voluntarily not to inquire about criminal history in 
the initial application form and thereby narrow the impact of a criminal 
record on employment. 
The realignment approach also encompasses tort reform and 
reductions in state-mandated collateral consequences. If employers do 
not perceive background checks as helpful in complying with licensing 
and other regulations, they may stop routinely conducting background 
screening. Similarly, tort reform may reduce reliance on background 
checks. If background checks do not insulate against negligent hiring 
liability, employers may find the process of conducting background 
 
 219. Adam M. Gershowitz, The Intake Prosecutor: Prosecutorial Screening Before The Police 
Make Warrantless Arrests 19–20 (William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-362, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037172&download=yes [https://perma.cc/
94TK-JUM7] (collecting evidence to show that “the internet remembers” arrest history regardless 
of whether they are dismissed or expunged).  
 220. Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical 
Discrimination: A Field Experiment 4 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 16-012, 
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 [https://perma.cc/X P63-
4ZK7] (finding that ban the box increases racial discrimination in callbacks). 
 221. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BACK TO BUSINESS: HOW HIRING FORMERLY 
INCARCERATED JOB SEEKERS BENEFITS YOUR COMPANY 8–9 (2017), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/060917-trone-reportweb_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D645-DJRV] 
(“At Total Wine & More, human resources managers found that annual turnover was on average 
12.2 percent lower for employees with criminal records. Electronic Recyclers International (ERI) 
saw a similar outcome: by adopting a program to recruit employees with criminal histories it 
reduced turnover from 25 percent to . . . 11 percent.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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checks less valuable overall.222 
Other methods of realignment include raising the cost of 
conducting background checks. One way to do this is to raise the price 
of accessing criminal records. Another is to penalize the overbroad use 
of criminal records, such as through rigorous enforcement of 
antidiscrimination laws in cases where criminal record screening 
creates a disparate impact. The realignment approach may also include 
promoting information about the legal risks of using criminal records 
in overbroad ways. The background check industry has an incentive to 
emphasize negligence liability, but there is no equivalent private 
industry with a stake in emphasizing the potential for violating 
antidiscrimination laws. Employers thus may overestimate the risk of 
negligent retention and hiring liability and underestimate the risk of 
violating antidiscrimination laws. Raising awareness of the monetary 
costs of violating antidiscrimination law—as well as actually increasing 
the likelihood that those who violate antidiscrimination law will face 
sanctions—could curb uses of criminal records that do not align with 
the state’s interest in punishment.223 
These reforms have the potential to reduce the impact of a 
criminal record. They also, however, require stakeholders to give up 
information that they perceive as valuable or to incur the costs 
associated with changing their existing practices. Unlike reductions in 
mass incarceration, which have been conceptualized as a way to save 
costs for the state while also avoiding unnecessarily punitive policies, 
meaningful reform in the misdemeanor context will require that key 
institutions change practices that they view as being in their immediate 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal justice system is often viewed largely as the product 
of overly punitive laws and excessive punishment. This perspective is 
powerful, particularly in the context of excessive prison sentences. It 
does not, however, fully account for the practices of low-level criminal 
 
 222. Id. at 13–14 (collecting examples of negligent hiring reform in a number of states that is 
designed to facilitate hiring criminal record-holders). 
 223. The penalties for antidiscrimination violations can be significant. The U.S. Census 
Bureau recently settled an antidiscrimination lawsuit based on its overbroad criminal records 
policy for $15 million in damages. Tanzina Vega, Census Settles Hiring Lawsuit Over Criminal 
Records, CNN MONEY (Apr. 19, 2016, 6:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/19/news/
economy/census-bureau-hiring-lawsuit-settlement/index.html [https://perma.cc/8WW2-KT39]. 
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courts and for ubiquitous collateral consequences. This Article 
suggests that the problem is not only “too much” state action and 
overcriminalization; it is also institutional incentives that do not align 
with the public goals of promoting safety and seeking proportionate 
sentences. Addressing this dynamic requires first recognizing that key 
decisionmakers have goals that deviate from the state’s sentencing 
goals; they do not all share an interest in promoting retribution or 
deterrence for society at large. Meaningful reform requires not only 
acknowledging the impact that the current system has on the poor and 
people of color, but also recognizing that the current system advances 
the perceived organizational ends of key actors. The cost-benefit 
calculus for key actors does not align with the cost-benefit analysis of 
the state as a whole. Reform thus will require stakeholders who benefit 
from the current system to relinquish those perceived benefits for the 
interests of a more equitable system as a whole. 
